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CHAPTER I
SIR ISAAC NEWTON IS DEAD
Education is experiencing seventy years later
the same upheaval that the science of physics underwent
at the beginning of this century. The old, Newtonian
notions of Space and Time, previously regarded as so
evident they needed no further examination, were in fact
re-examined by one Albert Einstein; and they promptly
fell apart. Absolutes vanished; in their place were dif-
ferent systems of meaning, all valid relatively. The
same thing is going on in education now. In both fields
the result of the upheaval in the concepts of space and
time is a redefinition of what it means to know anything.
The Newtonian concept of Space died long ago in
physics, but it has gasped on in education until almost
now. The concept was that Space was a pure, universal
vacuum: objective, abstract, uniform, neutral. Anything
might be "put into" it or "taken out" of it, but that
space would remain the same. It had no shape, nor indeed
any function other than to "contain" whatever the Maker
chose to fill it up with.
That description of Newtonian space is also a des-
cription of almost every classroom anyone alive in America
2today has ever set foot in. Those classrooms approximate
being absolute Space, They differ in size, not in char-
acter. The cube shape of the rooms merely emphasizes the
abstract, geometric quality of that space. Anything can
be put into it or taken out of it, the Space itself goes
on forever. Also -- since no two things can be in the same
Newtonian space at the same time — the walls of the class-
room are nothing more than necessary and natural boundaries
between things that are necessarily and naturally distinct
from one another. English space is not where History
space is
,
seven-year-old space is not where twelve-year-
old space is
,
principal space is not where teacher space
is, nor teacher space where pupil space is. Everything is
distinct, placed at different points and occupying different
volumes
,
but everything is ultimately contained in the same
neutral, impersonal, objective, intellectual, absolute
Newtonian Space.
A considerable number of contemporary educational
reforms and experiments are, implicitly or explicitly, an
attack on that kind of space. Some are quite physical
attacks. The Open Space approach literally tears down walls
to achieve a freer, less homogenized, more personalized kind
of space. The Open Classroom approach allows students to
determine how space v/ill be used. The School Without Walls
approach, like Work-Study terms on the college level, simply
moves the learning theater outside any kind of classroom
3space at all. Learning space now is the city, the factory,
the theater, the park: space construed concretely, im-
pressionistically. The increasing use of electronic media,
too, involves a physical attack on the Newtonian classroom,
making it possible. for two worlds -- that of the viewer
and that on the screen — to inhabit the same space at the
same time. Not all the incursions against Newtonian Space
in the schools are so obviously physical, however. In the
early days of the current push against educational frag-
mentation, the rise of team teaching brought about a limited
transformation of school space. Putting together different
age- and IQ-groups in the same classes is intended to have
the same kind of effect. And the quality of schoolroom
space has also been changed by the removal of that all-but-
visible line used to separate teacher space from student
space. The cumulative effect of these changes has been to
destroy what traditionally was meant by "space" in educa-
tion.
In education as in physics, the assault on Time
has- accompanied the assault on Space. Newton at the
beginning of the Principia wrote that "absolute, true
and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature,
flows equably without relation to anything external."
That is as perfect a definition as, we will ever have of
old-fashioned school-style bell time. Almost everything
going on in contemporary education is an attempt to be
rid of it. Such now-conventional devices as back-to-
back scheduling and flexible scheduling go a small dis-
tance toward making school time less "absolute, true and
mathematical." The more adventuresome experiments in
the Integrated Day programs and in the use of a modular
credit system and of independent study go still farther
towards breaking down a kind of time that "flows equably
without relation to anything." Still more subtly and
with more far-reaching implications, attempts are being
made to reunite the psychomotor, affective, and cogni-
tive aspects of the learning process
,
by trying to let
them work simultaneously instead of consecutively. The
old way was to have a time for the mind (the academic
subjects), another time for the feeling (the arts, etc.),
and another time for the body (crafts, athletics).
It was no small thing to unseat Newton in the world
of physics, and it is no small thing to unseat him in the
world of education. For what collapses with Newton is,
finally, not just a parcel of unexamined assumptions about
space and time. What collapses are still more basic as-
sumptions about the nature of reality and of the mind and
of their relationship to each other. The Newtonian mind
lives in absolute space and time, observes things within
such space and time , measures events against such space
5and time. But the post-Newtonian mind creates its own
That is
,
the very notions of space and
time — whether Newton's or anyone else's — are them-
selves products of the human mind, and as such are inter-
pretations and transformations of reality* They are
metaphors. The farthest-reaching implications of Einstein's
revolution in physics was that all scientific categories
are free creations of the mind. The farthest-reaching
implication of contemporary movements in education is that
everything we know is a creation of the mind that knows
it. The attack on traditional Space and Time is ultimately
an attack on the mind as a passive seer of predetermined
reality. The attack rests, then, implicitly on the stag-
gering assumption that the mind makes what it knows, and
therefore can unmake it, or remake it.
"The mind is its own place," and it plays with
reality endlessly. Jean Piaget has watched meticulously
how little children structure and restructure their re-
sponses to their environments -- structure and restructure
reality . Along a similar line, a man named Adelbert Ames,
Jr.
,
whom both Whitehead and Dewey considered to be one of
this century's most important thinkers,^ conducted
^Hadley Cantril, ed.
,
The Morning Notes of Adelbert
Ames, Jr. (New Brunswick, N.J.; Rutgers University Press,
1960 ) , p. V.
6experiments on visual perception until his death in 1955,
and reached some conclusions that can stand as a nearly
definitive statement of what the post—Newtonian mind is
like
;
...what an. observer is perceptually
aware of is --
1. His own unique interpretation
of the significance to him of
environmental conditions from
his unique point of observation
and behavioral center, and
2. is ( sic ) different from what
any other observer can be per-
ceptually aware of, and
3. that his perceptions are not
the result of a causal chain
of events originating in the
environment but are his own con-
tribution to the perceptual
situation, and may or may not
correspond to what he is looking
at as it is perceived and known
to others . . .
^
Because Ames' own statements of the conclusions
he reached were never set down systematically and exist
only in the form of rather scattered notes
,
we will let
two of his most devoted admirers paraphrase and organize
those conclusions here:
. . .we do not get our perceptions from
the "things" around us. Our perceptions
come from us ...
.
Secondly, it seems clear from the
Ames studies that what we perceive is
• f
2 Ibid p. 136
.
7largely a function of our previous
experiences, our assumptions, and our
purposes ....
Third, we are unlikely to alter
our perceptions until and unless we
are frustrated in our attempts to do
something based on them.
. .
.
Fourth, since our perceptions come
from us and our past experience, it is
obvious that each individual will
perceive what is "out there" in a
unique way ....
Fifth, perception is, to a much
greater extent than previously imagined,
a function of the linguistic categories
available to the perceiver
. . .
.
Sixth, the meaning of a perception
is how it causes us to act....^
The educational reforms which have already swept
away the outmoded Newtonian concepts of Time and Space
have still another task to perform, one even more far-
reaching. Put negatively, the task is to leave behind
once and for all the Newtonian mind that created those
concepts in the first place. Put positively, the task
is to work out what the post-Newtonian, Amesian kind of
mind is, how it operates, and how to help its development
through the services of the educational institution. Ac-
cordingly, the purpose of the present study is to present
a practical model of the workings of that mind, and there-
by to point a direction for the on-going educational re-
form. The model envisioned here operates exactly and
^Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, Teaching as
a Subersive Activity (N.Y.: Dell Publishing Company, 1969)
,
p.'W^
8as the Ames studies have discovered the mind to
work. But the hope here is to be more operational than
Ames, who was content to remain purely a researcher and a
laboratory experimenter.
The main rdea of the present work is that the mind
creates meanings for itself by making metaphors
,
and in
altered circumstances it recreates meanings for itself by
making new metaphors. Metaphor is the device by which the
mind actively structures its perceptions of reality. A
metaphor is the comparison of one thing or concept to another,
a connecting of one to the other. Or, as Webster defines
it, a metaphor is "a figure of speech founded on resem-
blance, by which a word is transferred from an object to
which it properly belongs to another in such a manner that
a comparison is implied though not formally expressed."
A metaphor is, then, a way of looking at some piece
of reality or other, a way of structuring perception, a
free creation of the mind. Largely because of his past
experience, a person will tend to favor one metaphor over
another. The metaphors that work for one person may not
work for another, and may even not work for their creator
in altered circumstances — although their creator will
cling to them for as long as he can, out of laziness,
habit, fear, or aesthetic preference. Since metaphors
control the way we see reality, they therefore wind up
9controlling how we behave in it as well, because they
open up or close off the number of active relationships
we can have to it.
It may be -- indeed, it is the main thesis of
the present study that if education were fully to
accept Ames s post—Newtonian model of how the mind works
,
we would wind up with an education in which metaphoric
thought would occupy the central place. In this study
we will explore metaphor as a potentially useful tool
in education for helping people to structure and, when
necessary, to restructure their vision of reality.
CHAPTER I I
THE CREATION AND COMMUNICATION OF MEANINGS:
THE STRUCTURING OF EXPERIENCE
In the random and excessive flow of reality
the mind has to find meanings, or rather, create them.
In and of itself "reality" means nothing. Only when first
biologically and then mentally we sort it out into pat-
terns, into repetitions, into familiar clusters, does it
begin to mean something. Ultimately the meaning of
things is in the mind, not in the things. Confronting
the universe of raw experience without mental structures
is very much like looking at photographs for the first
time. People in primitive tribes are said not to recog-
nize themselves or anything else in photographs because
the black and white splotches on the paper simply do not
make patterns to them. Consequently they do not mean
anything to them. Such people do not see themselves as
black-and-white, nor as two dimensional, nor as fitting
onto a 4 X 5 glossy piece of something. Thus, if the
meaningful pattern is not in the mind, it does not exist
at all. The photograph is seen as a photograph by a mind
prepared to organize in that. way the sense impressions it
causes. But the same item is seen as chaotic grays on a
shiney field of white by a mind not so prepared.
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The process of creating meanings by mentally struc-
turing the random flow of reality makes possible the process
of communicating those meanings to others. The two processes
are closely related. But the priority goes to the creating
of meaningful patterns, not to the communicating of them.
We will be paying most of our attention to the first-order
Process of creating the mental patterns that structure
experience. We will pay some attention to the second-
order process of communicating those meanings as well, but
not as much.
And really the two processes are so similar that if
we discuss one we can understand both. They both involve
the same two fundamental problems. First, there is the
problem of the integration, disintegration, and reintergra-
tion of meaning patterns. In both the creation and the commun-
ication of meanings there is at first the coalescence of pat-
terns in the mind, then the partial or complete failure of
the pattern to hold its own against new data of experience,
and finally the search for a new pattern that will be more
adequate than the first. The second problem concerns how
those patterns emerge in the first place, as the products of
rational or of nonrational or of irrational mental processes
— or in a different but equivalent vocabulary, as the pro-
ducts of conscious, preconscious , or unconscious mental pro-
cesses. We will discuss the processes of creating and com-
municating nieanings in terms of these two problems. After that.
12
we will analyze more broadly how the human being struc-
tures his experience, biologically and mentally.
The Creating of Meanings
Let us say. a man falls in love with a woman. He
has not been in love before
. He has gone along as a
fairly happy bachelor who had arranged the details of his
life pleasantly enough to suit himself. He had structured
his over-all experience viably. But now because he has
fallen in love his normal schedule has become suddenly
inconvenient, his usual diet uninteresting, many of his
habits boring or distasteful, his job burdensome, his
favorite cat a nuisance, etc. The carefully structured
patterns of his bachelorhood, which had helped him make
sense of his life for a while, have just fallen apart.
He has the choice now either of trying to hold them
together against the intruding female, or of rebuilding
the patterns of his life around her and with her.
The pattern repeats itself wherever there is a
question of creating meanings. One structures his ex-
perience mentally. The mind moves from raw experience
into patterned meaning
:
Experience > Structure
The mental structure becomes so fajiiliar and works so
well that one forgets it is a creation of the mind, and
13
takes it for reality. It begins to feel self-evident and
self-validating. The reason for this is that the mental
structure is now increasingly controlling and limiting the
range of experiences one feels open to. The mental structure
patterns experience and in so doing tends to exclude from it
whatever might not fit the pattern. If experience underlies
and leads to the structure, the structure also underlies and
leads to future experience;
Experience < Structure
But then the new thing happens. Something new is
felt, some unaccustomed thing surfaces and makes itself hard
^ot to see. The old pattern does not help one in practice;
it leads to a defeat or a disappointment. The old and com-
fortable pattern of meaning becomes suspect. It is no longer
so inevitable nor so authoritative as it was. There are
things it has failed to take into account. Reality talks
back to the mind's neat meanings, and tries to force them to
broaden themselves:
New Experience > .»i r ^-i-n
The mind will not often feel comfortable with such
a situation, and may resist giving up its habitual ways of
handling experience. It may even prefer to set up a mental
para-world in competition to the non-mental world of experience.
What was its interpretation of reality now becomes its inter-
pretation against reality:
LIaw-Jg^-\^e V i eirr < Old Structure
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But sooner or later the old structures of the mind
will have to give up their hold. if only out of sheer ex-
haustion, they will have to give reality some kind of per-
mission to be more supple and various, more extensive, more
manifold than they ever have been themselves. At such a
moment we face a new dimension of life with no adequate
structure to make sense of it, yet we are in search of such
a new structure:
New Experience > ?? New Structure ??
When it is found the cycle of course will start again.
Always there are the conflicting claims of the world and of
the mind, of too much chaotic variety and of too much reduc-
tive order, of too much fluidity and of too much rigidity.
To acknowledge the simultaneous validity of these conflicting
claims, there is the on-going process of the integration,
disintegration, and reintegration of meanings. But what falls
apart and what pulls back together is not reality itself,
only our metaphors of it.
The two-way arrows we are using here are symbols, then,
that stand for opposing tendencies of the mind and that imply
a tension of values. What we might call the reality-based
arrow ( >) stands for the mind's moving from multiform im-
pressions toward reductive order. Here the ordering is important,
but not for its own sake. It is. important only to the extent
that it is based on and answerable to the empirical. It is not
15
a floating, autonomous order. It is a structure created
by the mind for the purpose of dealing with experience,
hence is constantly to be revised as that experience changes.
It is tentative order, willing to yield to the pressure of
reality, willing to bow out in favor of a new order, itself
also tentative, that might make better sense out of the
immensities and varieties of things. In other words, the
reality-based arrow implies the mind's awareness that all
its interpretations and structurings of things are metaphors
of reality. It implies, too, how fragile is the world of
the mind's meanings.
The other arrow (< ) we might call order-based.
It represents the mind's tendency to resist experience in
favor of clinging to meaning systems that become more and
more habitual. Here the mental structures determine what
shall be experienced, rather than vice versa. This is the
principle that makes possible mental stability in a universe
of flux. Because of it the mind rejects — or perhaps more
often simply fails to notice -- any discrepancies between
its systems and the world "out there." Here there is no
remembrance of metaphor. Mind and reality are equated di-
rectly. Here everything has a name, a place on a value grid,
a known function, a firm outline. This is the domain of
essences, the place of the Platonic te’mptation, and of the
Platonic sin. For here reality does not inform the mind.
Txie mind informs reality, and becomes its own emperor and
16
its own empire, needing an ever more rigidly guarded border
against the hostile intrusions of the outer darkness. One
thinks of a Kurt Vonnegut character who, confronted with
Death, commanded it to vanish. His authority for doing so:
His sovereign Imagination would not suffer Death's presence.
But these two principles are in tension because they
belong to the same system. Neither ever exists fully free
of the other. To be purely "reality-based" would be a har-
rowing madness of endless disconnections. To be purely
"order-based" would be a no less real madness of moribund
csi'taintie s . The mind seems unable to yield altogether to
either extreme. But that is not to say it is unwilling to
try. The positions taken on large public questions by
politicians, educators, religious leaders, and ordinary
citizens are frequently much less based on the merits of
tnose positions as such than on which of the two tendencies
of the mind they favor. Persons more "reality-based" will
tend to favor flexibility in political, educational, and
religious systems -- perhaps even to the point of ruinous
chaos. Persons more "order-based" will tend to favor maxi-
mum security in these same things. The real tension^ between
"liberals" and "conservatives," or between the far more ex-
treme "anarchists" and "fascists," is not basically an argu-
ment about the world. It is an argument about the mind.
It may seem as though there were an irreducible oppo-
sition between the two mental tendencies represented by the
17
two arrows. But there is also, or there can be, a harmony
between them — and not just a gentlemanly truce, either,
but a genuine cooperation. There is another kind of men-
tality than a drastically flexible one or a drastically
rigid one. Dr. Lawrehce S. Kubie
,
M.D.
,
introduces some
helpful distinctions on this point:
There is the realistic form of symbolic
thinking in which we are clearly aware of the
relationship of the symbols of language to
that which we intend to represent. Here the
function of the symbol is to communicate the
hard core, the bare bones of thought and pur-
pose. This is conscious symbolic function.
At the other end of our spectrum is the
symbolic process in which the relationship
between the symbol and what it represents has
been either distorted or completely ruptured
by an active process of dissociation in time
and place betv/een affect and its occasion,
which results in that dissociation between
symbol and its root, which leads to what is
called "repression." As a consequence, the
symbol here is a disguised and disguising
representative of unconscious levels of psy-
chological processes. In this area the
function of the symbolic process is not to
communicate but to hide, not deliberately but
automatically, and not only from others but
even more urgently from ourselves. This is the
unconscious symbolic process as it occurs in
dreaming and in psychological illness.
There is however another type of mentation
whose relationship to its roots is figurative
and allegorical. The function of this inter-
mediate form of mentation is to express at
least by implication the nuances of thought
and feeling, those collateral and emotional
references which cluster around the central
core of meaning. Here every coded signal has
many overlapping meanings; and every item of
data from the world of experience has many
coded representatives. This is the form of
18
coded language which is essential for all
creative thinking
,
whether in art or science
.
Therefore we will have much more to say about
It below. In technical jargon, this second
type of symbolic process is called preconscious .
^
The contribution of preconscious processes
to creativity depends upon their freedom in
gathering, assembling, comparing, and reshuf-
of ideas. Indeed the special creative
virtue of this continuous play of preconscious
processes, concurrently with conscious and
unconscious processes, lies in the fact that
it is the preconscious type of symbolic function
which frees our psychic apparatus (and more
specifically our symbolic processes) from
rigidity .... flexibility of symbolic imagery is
essential if the symbolic process is to have
that creative potential which is our supreme
human trait. I will repeat that this creative
flexibility is made possible predominantly if
not exclusively by the free, continuous, and
concurrent action of preconscious processes.^
VJhat we are calling the order-based type of mind Kubie
calls conscious and rational. What we are calling reality-
based (in the sense of empirical, random, unstructured) is
similar to, if not quite identical v/ith, what he calls uncon-
scious and irrational. The rational and conscious mind deals
in univocal meanings, the unconscious and irrational one in
equivocal meanings. Kubie 's main interest^ however is in what
he calls the preconscious mind, which is non-rational without
being either univocal or equivocal. It deals in meanings that
work by analogy. For the sake of making clear the relationship
^Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D., Neurotic Distortion of the
Creative Process (N.Y. : The Noonday Press, 1970), p. 30.
• r
2lbid p . 37
.
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to each other of the several technical words we are using
here, we might schematize the tripartite mind thus:
LEVEL
OF
MIND
DESCRIPTIVE
DEFINITION
RELATION
TO
LOGIC
BASE TYPE
OF
MEANING
CONSCIOUS rigid
like a solid
rational autonomous
order
univocal
UNCONSCIOUS amorphous
like a gas
irrational unassimilated
reality
equivocal
PRECONSCIOUS supple
like a liquid
nonrational association analogous
From the unconscious comes the strange, dark pressure
on us of all those things v;e have not known how to assimilate
from our interactions with reality, but which nevertheless
are there and seek some kind of recognition. From the con-
scious mind comes the clarity and logic of realities that have
been, or seem to have been, assimilated fully once and for all.
But from the preconscious comes reality in process of being
assimilated, no longer unconscious, not yet fixed in too firm
a conscious category, reality being arranged and rearranged
in different combinations by the mind that sees now one, now
another similarity among its elements. It is reality with a
soft outline, a changing face, and a playful disposition.
20
The scheme E < > M ,where "E" stands for Experience
and "M" for Metaphor, stands for the process of creating mean-
ings out of the unstructured materials of experience. The
process is a double one, symbolized here by the double arrow.
It involves a tension, between the distinct claims of reality
and of mind, reality claiming priority over mind and the right
to threaten any system the mind might produce to explain it,
the mind meanwhile claiming the right not to suffer reality's
confusion and the right to make order to replace it. Depend-
ing on how the tension balances, we wind up with one or the
other of the three mental levels described by Kubie. If the
randomness and dissociation of raw, felt, but unassimilated
reality dominates we have the situation of the unconscious
mind in which there are strong feelings but no clear meanings.
We can symbolize the imbalance this way:
> m
And if the hard precision of defined ideas and strictly logical
connections drives out awareness of the rich variety of things,
we have the situation of the fully conscious mind in which there
is no longer room for the intrusions of the real world:
e <
But v;hen there is a vigorous tension between the two poles, as
i ’iG simple scheme E < > M implies there ought to be, and the
21
mind loves reality's freedom as much as it loves its own
efforts to give a form to that freedom, the situation is
the happy marriage of opposites in which one contributes
what the other lacks. Here, meaning comes in the making
of metaphors.
True education results in the process symbolized by
the double arrow. It lacks neither the experience nor the
structure, the feeling nor the form, the immense freedom nor
the immense discipline. It is, then, less a matter of teach-
ing the permanent meanings of things than of teaching people
how to create meanings for themselves. In the psychological
lives of individuals and in the cultural lives of entire
societies there is the constant organizing and reorganizing
of experience into meanings. On both levels life is the
story of changing metaphors. And if education is to deal with
life it will have to deal with the processes by which meta-
pnoric meanings are created and are changed. Education, then:
a) must help people to trust their own experience (E)
,
to know v;hat that experience is, to be unfearful
If it is broader and subtler than their ideas or
contradicts some of their beliefs, to understand
that that experience of theirs is the prima materia
of their lives, the source, the empirical base
,
and ultimately the judge of all their values, ideas,
behaviors, and relationships;
b) must help them to explore the various ways of
structuring that experience (M) ; to do comfortably
without dogmatic, fixed meanings; to enjoy the
adventure of finding new metaphors or reconfirming
old ones; to cherish truths that can change;
22
c) and must teach them how to be the agents in
their own lives of that double process (< >)by which meanings are created.
The Communication of Meanings
The first mental process is to create meanings. This
happens within each individual mind. The process ends in the
production of metaphors that make some kind of sense out of
experience. The second mental process is to share such mean-
ings once they have been created. This second process, com-
munication, takes place when two parties, with different meta-
phors (M^ and M
2 )
to structure their differing experiences
(E^ and E
2 )
of reality, reveal those metaphors to each other.
The interaction on each other of those two sets of structured
meanings is the process of communication:
E, M,
"1" and "2" symbolize the parties involved in the proc-
ess. Party 1 could be either an individual or a group. Party
2 could be either an individual or a group as well. And, what
is probably the most intriguing combination for our psychological
age, the two parties may not even be separate beings at all.
They could be distinct "levels" of the same personality.
In the process of communication there is always consid-
erable tension, no matter who the parties are. In fact, there
are two distinct tensions, both symbolized in our diagram by
23
the vertical arrows. The first may be considered a "political"
tension between the parties involved. The second concerns
the symbols they use. The first may be considered as a ques-
tion of one party's establishing his power vis-a-vis the other.
The second is the question of what effect one party's metaphors
has on his understanding of the other party's metaphors.
First, the process of communication is a tension between
two power centers. It is a test of wills, and can even be a
crypto-battle. R.D. Laing relates an admittedly extreme example
An argument occured between two patients in the
course of a session in an analytic group. Sud-
denly, one of the protagonists broke off the argu-
ment to say, 'I can't go on. You are arguing in
order to have the pleasure of triumphing over me.
At best you win an argument. At v/orst you lose
an argument.
^
am arguing in order to preserve
my existence
.
"
But, as Laing points out, what is exaggerated here is some-
thing everyone experiences in less dramatic ways. "A firm
sense of one's own autonomous identity is required in order
that one may be related as one human being to another. Other-
wise, any and every relationship threatens the individual with
loss of identity" (p. 44)
.
In much that passes for communi-
cation in the world, the true issue is not meaning, but power.
This is perhaps easier to recognize in its more obnox-
ious forms uhan in its beneficial ones. The son is to do thus-
and-so "because your father said to." The daughter is expected
^R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 43.
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to share her mother's viewpoint because it is her mother's
viewpoint. The citizen is to value something and disdain
another because such is the American (or English or Chinese)
way. People are to believe that the Virgin Mary was taken
bodily to heaven because, sitting in the proper chair for
the purpose, the pope said she was. In this type of communi-
cation I accept or reject what you say to me because of who
you are to me.
But "you" are a possible threat to "me" in this case.
You by-pass my own perceptions, and take no account of my
experiences nor of what sense I have been able to find in them.
You ask me to trust your authority and to deny any of my own.
In essence, you are asking me to abdicate my position as an
s^^tonomous and self—validating person. There are always good
reasons given why I should do this: Society knows best, who
am I to judge anyway, it's better to believe too much than too
little, I can't go through life with a chip on my shoulder, etc.
It is altogether too easy to allow someone to exercize power
Yet that assertion of myself would set up a dynamic and posi-
tive tension between two parties who might then be mutually
respectful of each other. Only where that tension is present
will communication have to do with feelings, ideas, facts,
values, issues, meanings. Otherwise, it resembles nothing so
much as a military encounter, a getting and losing of ground.
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When this scuffling becomes the substance of the communi-
cation we suffer an eclipse of mind in a struggle for ter-
ritory. But when it is the preliminary to it, we have a
necessary and useful exchange of credentials.
The power conflict goes on, both in its harmful and
its beneficial aspects, whenever there is a communication.
When two individuals speak there is inevitably a skirmishing
for position — for a position of advantage if the conver-
ss-tion takes place in an implicit or explicit atmosphere of
ihtimidation
,
or for a position of equality if the conversation
takes place in an atmosphere of trust and mutual esteem. The
same kind of power conflict goes on when one (or both) of the
parties is a group or society rather than an individual. For
a group has a quasi-personality which can be described by
the same formula as the personality of an individual: E < > M.
The members of the group have a shared experience "base" and
shared ways of structuring and expressing that common experi-
ence. Otherwise, they are not a coherent group. They are
only an accidental combination.
.
It must be noticed, however, that a group personality
is much more constricted than an individual one. The experi-
ences shared by the members of the group are not all of the
experiences they have individually. The members of the group
have similar but far from identical genetic inheritance, organ-
isms, and environments, and make similar but not identical
responses. Groups are based on the similarities and fall apart
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over the differences. In this sense, then, a group has a
minimum personality, a lowest-common-denominator personality,
based on a limited portion of its members' total experien-
tial base, and structured and expressed through a limited
portion of the total metaphors actually used by them as
individuals. Strangely, it is the attenuated personality
of a group that frequently overwhelms the far fuller per-
sonality of an individual, with the effect of making him
increasingly distrust in himself whatever impulses, manners,
fantasies, or beliefs of his are not the common property of
the whole group.
Still, the struggle for power in communication is
not won by sheer numbers or weight. Societies produce their
own critics as well as their own followers. Some men assert
their individual authority in the face of the more massive,
but neither more nor less authentic, authority of the group.
The political tension between individual and group makes for
tyrannies if the group wins all the power, for anarchies if
the individuals win all the power, and for a creative social
tension if they both win in the contest for power.
The same kind of shifting for position that happens
among individuals and groups takes place also within an in-
dividual. We talk to ourselves more than we realize, and
that talking is in part a contest for primacy among the forces
within us. We know that at their best our motives are mixed,
our emotions ambivalent, our attitudes contradictory, our
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behavior inconsistent, our personalities heterogeneous,
the messages we send ambiguous — not totally so, but gen-
uinely so nevertheless. If these inner divisions are acute
enough we cease to be functional and need therapy. But
even at that, the ambiguities within a personality are
fundamentally valuable, for they show a person that there
is more to himself than he has officially acknowledged,
that there are other possibilities within himself to be
explored. There is a kind of "second self" that "talks"
to the "first self."
In the case of intra-personal communication, it is
1-^beral and accurate to speak of distinct levels of experi-
ence. Nobody's experience is totally in agreement with
itself. For example, one's experience of sexuality may be
both exhilarating and harrowing. Or, physically one can
be both hungry and nauseated at the same time. Or, one
can simultaneously feel proud of himself and have doubts
about himself. On this pre-symbolic level of direct, unin-
terpreted, still unexpressed experience, there is no law
against a thing being both true and false at the same time.
Indeed, one's experience is made up of just such contraries,
and that is why it can be represented by and in our
basic diagram.
Further, each distinguishable aspect of one's exper-
ience seeks out its own proper vehical of expression (M) . One's
positive feelings toward, say, sex will express themselves in
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one set of fantasies, behaviors, values, roles, dreams, etc.
One's negative or confused feelings toward it will show up
in a very distinct set. in other words, one's divergent
experience is expressed in divergent metaphors. The meta-
phors which express and clarify experience also express and
clarify the ambivalences within that experience. It is,
in fact, the presence of these conflicting clusters of
metaphors in the same person that makes it possible for that
person to "get at" unresolved — and otherwise potentially
annihilating — tensions of his life.
The doubleness of personality is pathological only
If one dimension of experience is repressed in favor of
another, and its corresponding set of metaphors is repressed
in favor of the other set. Here too, the abuse of power will
cause a reaction against power. The abused "half" will have
its revenge, the oppressor "half" v;ill have its comeuppance.
But doubleness in personality — ambiguities of experience,
inconsistency of expressive metaphor — is far from being
automatically pathological. It is what keeps one's person-
ality an open system, free of self-strangling rigidities.
One is always more than he appears to his own official self
to be. Besides those dimensions of his own experience which
he has acknowledged and his society sanctioned, there are
other dimensions only dimly recognized. But those other dimen-
sions of experience are already making themselves known, through
unguarded thoughts, in dreams, in "Freudian slips," through the
spontaneous uses of leisure moments, through one's unexpected
empathy with this or that character in a film.
The other, hidden, unofficial self, which is sometimes
also the forbidden self, is constantly talking to the offi-
cial one, reminding it of doors it has too quickly closed.
It asks that its authority and power be recognized in the
conversation that goes on within the apparent unity of the
self
.
The first kind of tension symbolized by the vertical
arrow, then, is the result of each of the parties' trying to
set up a power base from which to communicate. The second
hind of tension is that between the symbols or metaphors
used by the two parties to convey their meanings to each
other. The difficulty with the metaphors is frequently
aggravated because people so easily forget that they com-
municate with each other, not at all directly on the level
of experience, but indirectly, on the level of symbolism.
We speak of heart-to-heart talks, of meetings of minds, of
seeing through each other, of feeling what the other fellow
feels. But all such statements, no matter how common they may
be, are inadequate to define what communication is all about.
The arrow symbolic of communication should not be seen as
connecting people on the level of experience:
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but on the level of structured meanings, symbols, metaphors:
M
nI'
M
2
The result of communication is that two people contact each
other. But the process of communication is that two sets of
contact each other. "I" set up my symbols, "you"
set up yours; I read yours in terms of mine, and you mine in
teinns of yours; we then each feel that, to a greater or lesser
extent, I know what you mean," and that there has been a
reasonably successful communication.
There is a key assumption being made here, without
which no communication is possible. It is the assumption
that your symbols relate to my experience basically in the
same way that ^ symbols relate to it. The assumption is
not always true, of course, but it is true often enough that
trying to communicate is not a hopelessly foredoomed enter-'
prise. Thus, if "you" are crying, "I" assume that one of the
things that would make me cry is now making you cry. Since
only sad things make me cry, I assume you must -now be sad. It
is possible, however, that you also cry when you are very happy
or confused or pressured — that in other v/ords, your tears are
a more ambiguous symbol than mine would be, and more open to
unwitting misinterpretation. But even so, my interpretation,
though in fact wrong, has a high degree of probability of being
right because it is based on v;hat tears usually mean. And it
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is this high probability, based on the assumption that your
experience and mine are parallel and that the symbols through
which we express ourselves are cognate, that makes it possible
for us to contact each other at all.
But there is a very important implication here. Bas-
ing communication on this assumption means that, when I read
your metaphors, I do not so much contact the meanings in your
head as I contact the meanings in my own. Your symbols con-
jure up my meanings, and I assume those are the same as yours.
In all communication there is radical sollipsism. It is less
a matter of my entering your mind than of my equating mine
with yours. It is not so much that I only hear what I want to
^
but that I only hear what I can hear. If l use my
inner experience as a block to perceiving yours, as in fact
a substitute for yours, I am guilty of pure projection; if,
more carefully and more sensitively, I use them as a basis
for trying to feel what yours might be, I am not projecting
but empathizing. The first is communication easy and false.
The second is communication more difficult and more true.
• The tensions between the symbols of communication can
be illustrated as follov\7s:
A monarchist and an anarchist would have no trouble
comn.unicating about kingship. They both mean exactly
the same thing by it, they only put a different price
on it
.
But a divine-right monarchist and a constitutional
monarchist would have considerable difficulties.
One says "king" to the other, meaning "figurehead,"
but inadvertantly conveying "absolute ruler." The
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two men, presented formally to the monarch on
an occasion of state, will not be kneeling tothe same thing.
On the cpther hand, if a constitutional monarchist
king to an American who says "president,"
they will have small difficulty seeing where
their meanings overlap and where they diverge.
The first instance -- the monarchist and the anarchist
is an example of univocal meaning in communication. What is
in "your" head is demonstrably identical with what is in "my"
head, or is so close that we would have to quibble to find the
fsi^snce
. We can picture the overlap of meanings this way;
The second instance -- the two kinds of monarchists --
is an example of equivocal meanings in communication. We use
the same word but mean almost totally dissimilar things.
The third — the monarchist and the democrat — use
different words, but in much of what they mean they overlap
Equivocal meanings • for the same symbol are obviously
the enemies of any kind of communication. Univocal meanings
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are often regarded as the ideal toward which all communi-
cation ought to strive, and this is true ^ we are talking
either about something that is of its nature cut-and-dried
and hence incapable of further development, or about some-
thing we have already, fully agreed on. It is in the third
possibility — communication by analogous concepts, by meta-
phoric overlap that the excitement of a genuine inter-
course of meanings takes place.
What Kubie says of the symbols within one's mind is
true also of symbols being exchanged between two parties.
They can be rational, univocal, consequently cold, limited,
brittle; or they can be hopelessly divergent, equivocal,
therefore rigid, confusing, devious; or they can be related
by analogy, rich in unexpressed implications, provocative,
open-ended, inviting more talk rather than less.
It is in this last way that art communicates. It
opens up further meanings by eliciting the personal and
subjective response of the beholder. A work of art not only
means what means, it also means what the viewer adds to it
by metaphoric connection. It not only tolerates but welcomes
this contribution to the fullness of associations that cluster
around it.
We have not yet in schools tried to do anything more
than to get people to quit making equivocal statements and to
start making univocal ones. For all that we talk about the
s-vills of communication we have done little to develop the
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richest of those skills, the exploring of analogies. For
in the process of communication there is, more often than
not, a tension between what one party means and what the
other means: a similarity that is not identity, a dissim-
ilarity that is not disjunction. Every word has a larger
cargo than its dictionary definition. Everything a person
says has unstated implications in his mind and conjures up
®till further associations in the mind of his listener.
The fun of talking is getting at those plus-meanings, those
feelings and ideas that come riding piggy-back on other
feelings and ideas. Those plus—meanings are the contribution
made by personal, subjective imagination to the otherwise
dreary prospect of always knowing just exactly, to the last
one-hundredth of a boring inch, what the other fellow means.
The skeleton of conversation is univocal symbols. But the
muscle and blood of it is in the free play of metaphor.
The Elements of Human Experience
The basic work of the mind is to create meaningful
structures out of the otherwise random flow of things. It
does this work by making connections, comparisons, metaphors.
The second work of the mind is to share with others
the meaningful structures that have been created. The work
of communication, too, is done by making connections, compar-
isons, metaphors.
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Since metaphor exists to structure and communicate
experience, the further study of what constitutes experi-
ence leads naturally to a deeper understanding of the role
of metaphor. For the remainder of this chapter we will
examine the elements of human experience.
When anyone speaks of some man's experience, the
reference usually is to the People, the Places, and the
Things of that man's life. V7e generally take experience to
be constructed of concrete nouns: substances, solid and
definable masses, particulars. Such a notion may do well
enough for the purposes of ordinary conversation, but it
will not hold up under reflection. For it is evident that
not all the People, Places, or Things that have in some way
been part of one's life are also part of what he would con-
sider his experience . Most, in fact, float in, through,
and out, leaving perhaps a tiny trace on the memory, but not
entering at all into the fabric of associations and meanings
that constitute one's total experience. We simply do not
register everything that goes on around us, even if it is
going on in full view. We exclude most of it, as we exclude
most of the sounds that fill the air. It is more than a matter
of merely not adverting to something, it is a matter of not
engaging with it at all. There is some sort of selection going
on, and it is this process of selection that determines what
will be one's experience and v;hat v/ill not. Indeed, experience
is not the list of nouns that answer the question What, it is
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the process that answers the question How. Experience is
an adverb, the qualifier of a process, the modifier of an
interaction, the determiner of a relationship.
This can be better understood if we break the global
concept "experience" down into smaller parts. For it is
clear that there are many selections going on and many trans-
formations. In the simple act of vision, for example, there
are at least these: First, my eye itself as a physical organ
selects one small band out of all the range of radiant energy
to respond to, and in so doing defines and also radically
limits what I can respond to visually in the world. Next,
once my organism has decided to perceive some things in terms
of light, my eye will fall on certain things in the scene
before it and not on others. Either I will deliberately
exclude anything that is irrelevant to my conscious purposes
at the moment, or unconsciously and for reasons secret even
to myself I will favor some things over others and fix on
them. Further, there is a whole complex of emotional responses
that continues processing and transforming the thing I am look-
ing at as it goes its way through my experiencing system. The
sight of the thing may be pleasurable or painful, attractive
or repulsive, etc. It is, then, interpreted as being emotion-
ally acceptable or not. Still further, the object I am look-
ing at may in my mind stand for thing's in my past, or for
v/ishes and hopes of mine I have formed for the future, or for
my fears, so that the object begins to have about it that aura
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of larger meaning that surrounds literary symbols. Thus,
my interaction with the object actually is many experiences
of It at once, all interlocking, hierarchically ordered
among themselves, which blend so perfectly together that
they give me the helpful illusion of a simple and direct and
literal and objective contact with some little piece of the
world "out there."
Thus, experience is the sum, to date, of the inter-
actions of an organism with its environment.
For us human beings, experience is of two orders si-
multaneously; biological and mental. There is our biological
interaction with reality, determined by the kind of organism
we are. There is also our mental interaction with reality.
And there is, finally, the interaction within us of the bio-
the mental. When v^e speak of the metaphoric
structuring of experience, then, we are speaking of a contin-
uum of things:
E <• •> M
(biological < > mental)' < > M
Biology is concerned in the first place with one's
physical organism (0)
.
It is also concerned with the environ-
ment (En) in which that organism functions. And it is concerned
with the genetic endowment (G) which makes it possible for that
organism to exist at all. From the genes comes the organism:
G > 0
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The environment determines the success or failure of the
genetically constituted organism:
0 < En
So that, putting the two together:
G > 0 < En
But we know also that the organism, by its health and
viability, favors some of the mutations of the genes and, by
its lack of health and its dysfunctions, suppresses others:
G < O
We know too that an organism does not passively accept the
elements around it, but actively arranges them to make a
workable environment for itself
:
So that
:
0 > En
G < o > En
And to put it all together thus far
:
G < > 0 < — > En
This is the triad of evolutionary forces. The constant
interaction among these three factors constitutes the first,
the biological structuring of the otherwise random flow of
reality
.
For man, however, the process does not end there. By
whatever epigenesis from the biological level it may have come
_
to be, the symbol-making mind is the fourth element in the
continuum of experience. Making symbols is the specifically
human response (R) to the flow of being. It is the fourth
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determiner of our interactions with reality, and is itself
in interaction with the elements of our biological nature.
Finally, it is the source of those metaphoric structures
by which we understand anything:
E
> o < > En) <
-> ^ < > M
We will look now more closely at the biological and
mental constituants of experience. For these are the things
that the mind will organize into patterns meaningful to it-
self through the making of comparisons, connections, metaphors
I • The Organism: Nature's Epistemology
The body is given like a fate. One v/ill be able to
do what his body can do, and v;here it fails him he fails. It
is the major resource, and the major limitation, of one's life
It is, so to speak, a gift of the genes and a gift of the
environment which supports it — a more or less generous gift,
depending on the viability of the genetic structure and the
appropriateness of the supporting environment. This compli-
cated symbiotic arrangement is explained simply by the eminent
geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky:
A human egg cell weighs roughly one twenty-
millionth of an ounce; a spermatozoon weighs
much less; an adult person weighs, let us say,
160 pounds, or some fifty billion times more
than an egg cell. The material for this grov/th
comes evidently from the environment. In a
broad sense, this is the food the organism con-
sumes and transforms into constituents of the
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body. A human body transforms its food inways somewhat different from a dog's or afrog s or a fly's body. The transformations
occur according to the instructions emanat-ing from the genes, by way of the DNA-RNA-
ribosomes-proteins chain of command. The
outcome of the transformation depends, how-
ever, not only on the genes, but also on
the materials to be transformed, that is,
on the kind of food the organism consumes
and on the conditions under which it develops.
The phenotype is, then, a result of inter-*
actions betv/een the genotype and the sequence
of the environments in which the individual
lives .
^
The complex interaction described here is symbolized by our
schema: G > 0 < En.
As it is given by the genes and as it is nourished
and developed by its environment, the actual physical body
is the basis of all of one's experience. It not only estab-
lishes the limit of possible experience and knowledge, it
is_ that limit. Philosophers have looked, from Plato to Kant
and from Kant to the psychoanalysts, for the apriori struc-
tures of human knowledge
. But they have looked for them in
the mind. Nature has laid down an apriori more obvious and
more stern: the body. Nature's epistemology, unlike that
of the philosophers, is biology itself. One will interact
with — "know" --- his environment in the way his body allows
him to. The more complex and supple his organism is, and the
more tools it contains in the form of levers, cutters, grasper
^Theodosius Dobzhansky, Heredity and the Nature of
Man (N.Y.; The New American Library, 1966), p. 58.
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digesters, sensors, motors, etc., the more he will be able
to relate to — "know" — in his surrounding physical world.
Since the body is the basis of all knowledge, it
is not surprising that myths, the first articulated forms
that human knowledge took, made the world seem to be a great
human body, built in basically the same way as we are built
ourselves. Change a man's body and you have literally changed
his world .
^
The body as epistemological limit is directly exper-
ienced by each individual. But the ways that that body has
come to be as it now is are more hidden, and are not directly
experienced by individuals. The body is the product of eons
of evolution, the result of having faced and solved endless
series of problems that no one now remembers. The body's
3-i^cane wisdom has been in the making for billions of years,
from the first broth, and from the slime beneath the broth.
There are two forces that have shaped and reshaped it, changed
and changed again the structure of its organs and therefore
the shape of its knowledge of reality. Those forces are the
genes and the environment: G > 0 < En,
II . The Genes: Nature's "Ethics"
The body is both a stable legacy and a tenuous experi-
ment. Looked at one way it seems given once and for all. It
^We will discuss more fully in Chapter III the function
of myth.
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IS passed on to the next generation most carefully and con-
servatively. Biological heredity does not try experiments
much beyond the sort of fooling it does, say, with eye and
hair color among Caucasians. And even such small experi-
ments turn out to be strictly obedient to Mendel's laws.
The genes (G > 0) are the principle of biological sta-
bility. The most evident talent of living matter is that
it can reproduce itself with a precision bordering on the
uncanny
.
But the genes are doing something more than guaran-
teeing that things will always remain the same. They are
also guaranteeing that things will not remain the same;
How many genes man has, is not knov/n; very
imprecise estimates range from 10,000 per sex
cell upward. If all genes undergo mutation
with average frequencies*
,
the combined inci-
dence of all mutations would be quite substan-
tial. If, let us suppose, man has at least
20,000 genes (10,000 from his mother and an
equal number from his father)
,
the chances
become 0.00004 X 20,000, or 0.8. It would seem
then that 80 per cent of the individuals born
contain in their genetic endowments a mutant
gene they have not inherited from their par-
ents. This may be an overestimate, because two
or more new mutants may by coincidence be in
the same person; on the other hand, 10,000
genes per sex cell is probably an underesti-
mate. Even taking the low estimate of 10,000
genes and 1:100,000 as the mutation rate
per gene, the calculation gives about 20 per
cent, or almost one in five individuals born,
as the number of carriers of newly arisen
mutant genes. It is clear, then, that mutation
is not at all a rare phenomenon.^
* (of about 4:100,000)
^Dobzhansky, ibid .
,
p. 123.
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The genes are the principle of biological creativity as
well as of biological stability. They seem at one and
the same time to be totally mechanistic and totally random.
Insofar as they stabilize living matter they are the most
awesome example in all nature of pure determinism. But
insofar as they suddenly, abruptly change — for no known
internal reason and for no reason external — they are
nature s most astounding instance of pure indeterminism.
The mutations occur in a splendid disregard of whether
they may be of any practical use whatsoever
. The formula
G > 0 thus suggests the organism's subjection to both
genetic determinism and genetic caprice.
But the process does not end there. The organism
also reacts to genetic mutation: G < 0. Frequently
it reacts against it. The mutation may distort or weaken
the organism, and be no progress at all. If left to nature,
without the interventions of medicine or surgery, an organ-
ism thus distorted or weakened will tend to use either or
both of two devices to try to cancel out the mutant gene.
Either the organism will die before reaching maturity, or it
will reach maturity but be sterile. If, on the other hand,
the organism "accepts" the mutation as not being intrinsically
harmful, it will pass it on as it does all the rest of its
genetic endowment: according to Mendel's laws. C. D.
Darlington describes the process:
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Living organisms have made the discovervthat lower-level irregularities in mutation
and recombination, if not suppressed or buf-fered, can be exploited. In order to exploitthem the organism can actually use them toboost one another. By a regulated irregular-ity in the recombination of mutations in the
sexual alternation of diploid and halved
phases of life, they are, as it were, skill-fully exposed to the action of selection in
changing or optional environments generation
after generation. Selection acts determin-
istically so that the environment can appear
to change the organism and change its hered-
ity in the course of evolution. It can
appear (until we have microscopes and exper-
iments to guide us) to act directly. The
intercalated uncertainty in the living sys-
tems is the means of establishing a deter-
ministic relationship between the succession
of living systems and the environment. This
intercalation of uncertainty has become the
key mechanism of evolution. It is perhaps
the fundamental discovery of life. ''
In the double process, G < > o, there is a sort of
tension of opposite values, almost a kind of dual ethic. Be-
sides contributing to the structure of experience the actual
physical organism, the double process also contributes to it
the feel of paradox, a preference for dualisms, a taste for
the possibilities latent in a contradiction, a desire for
vital tensions rather than sterile neutralities. The life
process on the level of genes and organism is a dialectical
one, and it is so on every other level of life as well. On
the one hand it shows up as a stabilizing force; the genes
^C. D. Darlington, Genetics and Man (N.Y.: Schoken
Books, 1969), p. 351.
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duplicating themselves accurately, the organism resisting
mutations. On the other hand it shows up as a creative
force: the genes mutating, the organism accepting and
perpetuating some of the mutations. it is as though the
process symbolized in the formula G < > o were the
first approximation of what, in conscious life, will be
an ethic: Change AND Stay the Same. It is by being both
mechanistically determined and purely random that biologi-
cal life has come to be and has made its slow climb to the
level we know.
We can recognize in the dialectics of biology the
beginning of the dialectics of the mind and of all the
products of the mind. Here too the conflicting values of
permanence and change have determined progress. Only, on
the level of mind the conflict does not concern the condition
of physical forms, but of symbolic forms. The evolution is
not the evolution of organs and bodies but of languages,
beliefs, and cultures. Biology suggests a dialectical ethic
for cultural (and therefore educational) projects, a value
system that profitably contradicts itself by wanting both
firmness and fluidity for its symbolic forms. We have refer-
red already to the paradoxical need both to structure and to
change structure, and we will look again at this phenomenon
below. For nov/ it is enough to point out the adumbration of
that dual process on the most basic and universal level of
life itself. It is one of the deepest elements of experience.
But G
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> 0 and G < o do not describe all
the mechanisms which provide the first structuring of
experience for man. There is also the impact of the en-
vironment; 0 < En.
Ill . The Environment; Nature's Politics
...beyond conception, v/hatever we observe
or measure of the organism is a phenotype,
and this by definition is not "fixed." The
phenotype is a result of the organism's
internal genetic mechanisms established at
conception and all the physical and social
influences that impinge on the organism
throughout the course of its development.^
Arthur Jensen here is stating the pattern with which
we started this discussion of experience; G > 0 < En
Until the idea of genetic mutation was invoked to account for
the evolution of biological forms, many people, notably
Lamarck early in the last century, thought evolution took
place by the interaction of the organism and its environment,
0 < > En, or more specifically by the influence of the
environment on the organism, 0 <- En. This view, now
scientifically discredited, has been the object of delightful
satires;
^Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scholastic Achievement?" Harvard Educational Review,
XXXIX, No. 1 (1969), 17. •
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D'J d‘>cc, p^pi, fcurf%t^ que
lo palmien »ocit ti gnndi?
— Cot pour qu< Ics giri/c»
p^.i*XQt lc» nurjgtr» onon enfant,
•• MaU alcn, papa, ^urftioi qcw
kcs giufti ont U cou li long f
— e.h bicnl c'cst pour pouvoir
ounger Ici palmier*, mon eofaoi.
ai let palmien ^uient tout
petiu. lei girafea icraicnl trea cm*
barrua^«
— li lo ginfa aviicnt le cuv,
»un, tilct xriicnt encOTt bita plui
ere buTus^o.
—Tell me, papa, why are palm trees so tall?
--It's so that the giraffes can eat them, my child, for...
...if palm trees were very small the giraffes would be
very inconvenienced.
—But then, papa, why do the giraffes have such long necks?
--Ahl That's so they can eat the palm trees, my child, for...
...if the giraffes had short necks .they would be even more
inconvenienced.
^
^Darlington, ibid
.
,
p. 54.
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Still, there is a near truth to the Lamarckian view.
The genes are by no means the sole forces at work in deter-
mining the biological structures of experience. Physical
environment plays a powerful role, if not quite the exclu-
sive role once theorized for it by Lamarck. if a mutation
of the genes had produced giraffe-length necks and forelegs
in an environment where there were only low grasses to eat,
the mutation would have had no survival value. Indeed,
chances are it would have been fatal. The environment does
not affect the genes directly (G < En)
. It affects the
o^qs-riism directly, and by that influence indirectly affects
the genes (G < 0 < En) .
The environment therefore becomes the third member
of the triad of the biological structuring of experience,
at least because it has a kind of political power over which
organisms will survive where (0 < En) . But its signifi-
cance in the shaping of Experience is broader than that.
Besides being the referee of evolution, the environment also
is actually the creature of evolution. It sets up the limits
within which living beings will have to function or die, but
also the life forms born into it change that environment to
favor their own survival. The politics works both ways. The
total environment is in very large part the product of all
the organisms that have lived within it (0 > En) . It is
not just the product of geological forces. Nowhere is this
more strikingly clear than in, the very air around the earth.
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All of the free oxygen presently in the air has been released
into It over billions of years by vegetation. The atmosphere
of the earth is both the cause and the effect of life:
O < > G.
No organism, however, has ever had as drastic an
impact on its own environment as man. Not content to change
a small corner of it to suit his small needs, man has, in
effect, reconstituted the whole thing. The organisms of
most animals prevent them from seeing the stars, or from
surviving beyond certain heights or depths, or from having
any interest in other foods than worms, or from caring about
territory farther than a yard away from home. But man's
organism imposes really very few such limitations, with the
result that he has sometimes been called- a "weed species,"
capable of surviving almost anywhere.
And that is not all. He goes beyond the capacity of
his own remarkable organism to endure, and finds out the ways
first to survey and then to survive in worlds of water and
worlds beyond the air. The mind of man has created the real
environment of man, and that environment is: everything that
exists . It is not poetic fiction but hard truth that pi
mesons and the Andromeda nebula and even the invisible radio
stars and the least crustacean and the oddest moss are all
of them parts of the effective environment of man. And in a
sense too man has become the most important part of their
environment. Between man and the rest of creation there is a
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political union in the making. This situation has not
come about because of an immediate chemical or physical
survival value that the rest of remote creation may have
for the human species. It has come about simply because
man has decided it would. His greatest impact on his
environment has so far not been a physical act at all.
It has been a silent decision of the mind to consider
all things knov/able. Only now is man's physical impact
on his vast environment, or its on him, beginning to be
at all comparable to the mental one.
But that is not to imply that the mental restruc-
turing of the environment has remained within the skull as
a pure possibility, an agenda yet to be acted on. Besides
reinterpreting the whole of nature as his own proper envi-
ronment to be understood and manipulated by means of his
own skills, man has created another kind of environment for
himself (0 > En) . It is an environment not made up of
the physical, chemical, electromagnetic, or atomic things
of nature. Instead, it is made of symbols created by the
human mind itself over the centuries. This second environ-
ment is human culture. Its elements, analogous to the ele-
ments of nature, are the symbolic or metaphoric structures
through which men have articulated for themselves from pre-
historic times their beliefs, values, knowledge, morals,
feelings, behaviors, relationships, etc. Man has surrounded
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himself so completely by his own symbols that they con-
stitute the most obvious and pressing environment, one
more real than "nature," one indeed of which nature is
only a part, a raw resource, a factor in the economy.
On this level of experience the environment is metaphor
and metaphor is the environment.
The environment of human culture is both the cause
and the effect of the metaphoric structures individual
people will have in their minds. If we take "1" to mean
the individual and "2" to mean the culture or society, we
have the two kinds of metaphor, and M^. If we want to
schematize the origins of cultural forms in the minds of
individual people, we would do it this way:
If we wish to schematize the impact of the metaphoric forms
of the cultural environment on the images of the individual
mind, we would do it this way:
The process goes in both directions, new cultural
forms being created by the genius of individual people, and
the old cultural forms functioning as the environment in
52
which individual people live and develop. But both ways
we are dealing with metaphors, creations of the mind. We
are not dealing with something older than the mind here
but with something younger, not with something more abso-
lute but with something less absolute, nor with something
inevitable and unchanging but with something alterable,
indeed with something forever in flux.
Some people have been so impressed by the power
of the great metaphors that have played the most important
parts in cultural history that they attribute to them an
almost metaphysical status. They cannot imagine the mind
thinking in any other forms, assert that these forms are
innate in the mind, and therefore deny effectively that
they are metaphors at all. This way of viewing the matter
is the essence of Platonism and of the more archaic reli-
gious modes of thought that Plato overhauled and ennobled,
but it is by no means restricted to the ancient world.
Indeed, one of its greatest spokesmen did not die until 1961.
He was Carl Jung.
It is instructive to see how Jung explains the ori-
entation of man to woman:
...the whole nature of man presupposes woman,
both physically and spiritually. His system
is tuned in to woman from the start, just as
it is prepared for a quite definite world where
there is water, light, air, salt, carbohydrates,
etc. The form of the world into which he is
born is already inborn in him as a virtual
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image. Likewise parents, wife, children,birth, and death are inborn in him as virtualimages, as psychic aptitudes. These a priori
categories have by nature a collective char-
acter; they are images of parents, wife, and
children in general, and are not individual
predestinations. We must therefore think ofthese images as lacking in solid content,
hence as unconscious. They only acquire solid-iby
,
influence, and eventual consciousness in
the encounter with empirical facts, which touch
the unconscious aptitude and quicken it to life.
They are in a sense the deposits of all our
ancestral experiences, but they are not the
experiences themselves. So at least it seems
to us, in the present limited state of our
knowledge. ( l must confess that I have never
ysb found infallible evidence for the inheri-
tance of memory images, but I do not regard
it as positively precluded that in addition
to these collective deposits which contain
nothing specifically individual, there may
also be inherited memories that are individ-
ually determined
^
Jung invokes the authority of the archetypes again and
again, but seldom so clearly as in this passage from his auto-
biography:
...where the existence of an unconscious
psyche is admitted, the contents of projection
can be received into the inborn instinctive
forms which predate consciousness. Their ob-
jectivity and autonomy are thereby preserved,
and inflation is avoided. The archetypes,
which are pre-existent to consciousness and
.
condition it, appear in the part they actually
play in reality: as a priori structural forms
of the stuff of consciousness. They do not in
any sense represent things as they are in them-
selves, but rather the forms in which things can
be perceived and conceived. Naturally, it is
G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology
(N.Y.: Meridian Books, 1956), p.~200’^!
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not merely the archetypes that govern theparticular nature of perceptions. They
account only for the collective component
of a perception. As an attribute of instinctthey partake of its dynamic nature
,
and con-
sequently possess a specific energy which
causes or compels definite modes of behavior
or impulses; that is, they may under certain
circumstances have a possessive or obsessive
force (numinosity
I )
.
And, in one astounding sentence he says: "Human knowl-
edge consists essentially in the constant adaptation of the
primordial patterns of ideas that were given us a priori.
Essentially Jung and the people who think like him
are raising to the level of absolute truth this kind of pattern:
2
And in the process of doing so he makes two fundamental errors:
(1) he forgets, or denies, that the "archetypes" are themselves
metaphors, hence are in no sense a priori structures of the mind;
and (2) he forgets, or denies, that all the forms of culture
are the products of individual minds that have created meanings
for themselves out of the flow of experience, and are valuable
G. Jung, Memories
,
Dreams
,
and Reflections
(N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 347.
G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self (N.Y.:
Mentor Books, 1958), p. 82.
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only to the extent that they help individuals to make
sense out of their lives. No doubt quite against his
conscious intentions, Jung has constructed an argument
for the fascist state or for the absolute church, in either
case for some force that would stand against the creativity
of the individual mind. For in this view such a mind is a
dangerous innovator. Indeed, Jung asks himself why the
individual conscious mind should exist at all, and says of
his own question; "...I cannot easily answer it. It is
a confession of faith. I believe that finally someone had
to know that this wonderful universe of mountains, seas,
suns and moons, milky ways, and fixed stars exists."
However poetic the answer, it fails to attribute to
the mind any active role whatsoever, other than merely to
be conscious. The world and the archetypes exist before
the mind, and the patterns of being constitute a wisdom
that needs no changing, that needs reinterpretation at most,
but that is as true for modern as for prehistoric man. Such
an argument makes too much of a metaphor and too little of
the mind.
The environment of man is twofold. It is nature,
but nature as reconstituted by the intervention of the human
^
^Jolande Jacobi, ed.
,
C . G . Jung ; Psychological
Reflections (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 35.
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mind. It is also non-nature, the world of symbolic forms
known as culture, which is itself the creation of the
human mind. The evolutionary triad of G < > o < > En
IS as basic to man's experience as to any other creature's.
But his experience goes beyond the biology of it. The new
element that makes his experience different is the way he
responds (R) to the world made by that triad of forces.
His response is, by the creative power of his mind, to make
symbols of it.
The Human Response; The Symbolization of Experience
The final dimension of experience concerns the funda-
mental, generic response the human organism makes to its en-
vironment. We are referring to that response insofar as it is
human, and are therefore not speaking of survival instincts
or mechanisms of self-defense or knee-jerks. The human
response to a stimulus does not go only through the reflex
arc. The flow of Stimulus into Response (S-R) does not, in
other words, go through an empty organism. There is a process
of mediation involved, or more accurately a process of symbolic
transformation. The fundamental human response to the environ-
ment is to make symbols of it and to deal with it only through
those symbols.
There are actually two kinds of symbols we make, one
concrete and the other abstract. They do not always sit v;ell
together, but for all their arguments they need each other.
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The concrete symbols are the visual, auditory,
kinesthetic, images through which we express how our world
has felt to us. They are personal and subjective (though
they can become cultural as well, if enough other people
accept them)
. They are more grounded in spontaneous affect
than in dispassionate observation, and are closely related
to our life-long tendency to imitate what we look at, to
internalize it by a sometimes physical but more often
abbreviated feeling out" of what it might feel like to us
to be that other thing or person. These images are accurate
but they are more accurate about the way we feel than about
the thing or person we are looking at. These images are,
then, more the products of play than of work, if by play we
mean pure participation in a process for no ulterior purpose
It is frequently assumed that this imagistic mode of recast-
ing our world is the special property of children and that
it is immature, but it is even more characteristic of the
greatest scientists and artists. It is the product of what
Kubie calls the preconscious mind. It may begin in child-
hood, but something is wrong if it ends there.
The way we go about this internalizing of the world
is elegantly simple. Essentially we imitate it. We proceed
by feeling out an analogy between something of ourselves and
something of our environment. We can see the process of imi
tation — of felt analogy -- at work in an infant imitating
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his parent. Jean Piaget describes such a process between
his daughter and himself. When she was one year old,
...she at once pulled her hair when I pulled
mine. She also touched her head when I did
so, but V7hen I rubbed my forehead she gave
up . . .
. .
.
(two weeks' later)
,
J. discovered her fore-
head. When I touched the middle of mine, she
first rubbed her eye, then felt above it and
touched her hair, after which she brought her
hand down a little and finally put her finger
on her forehead ... ^
^
In a more sophisticated version we can detect exactly the
same process in a grown man clutching the armrest of his chair
during a terrifying movie, or subtly repeating in his muscles
the "movements" of a piece of music. And using exactly the
same process, the mystic who gazes at the heavens expands his
own mind to their vast grandeur, and feels in himself the
power and the glory of creation. The same is true when the
theorist tries to remake, to imitate, some aspect of the world
in his theory.
We change what we imitate. What was external to us
becomes now an affect of ours, or a muscular movement of ours,
or an image, or a concept, or all of these together. The
thing has been reduplicated, but more accurately it has been
translated. Finally, we do not know the thing; we know our
kinesthetic, affective, aesthetic, conceptual response to the
^^Cited by Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper,
i^iacret's Theory Intellectual Development (New Jersey:
i-'roucice Hall, 1969), p. 61.
59
thing. We know of it what we feel in ourselves to be con-
sonant or dissonant with it. We know it insofar as we have
internalized it, and have internalized it only insofar as we
have imitated it. Thus imitation does not mean a passive
repetition. it is a creative act. Knowing is a creative
act. We know, not the thing, but the thing as we know it.
The process of imitation or of symbolization is a
double process, operating half concretely and half abstractly.
Our response to the environment is bipolar, and results in
bipolar symbolism. On the first level, it is affective and
kinesthetic, personal and subjective, preconscious
,
and
takes the form of dynamic images. On the second level it
is rational, impersonal, conscious, analytic, and takes
the form of strict concepts and of the logical relations
among such concepts. Abstract symbolism deals in concepts
rather than images, and is more given to analysis than to
emotional empathy
. It is uncomfortable with slippery mean-
ings or double meanings, and tries to nail to each word a
<^sfinition and to each proposition a single structure
and to each conversation a single form. Its process is not
playful imitation of external objects or people, but the
inner circuits of purely formal, purely logical relations.
In essence, it is logic and mathematics, and is correspond-
ingly univocal and formal. It is the kind of thing satirized
a number of years ago by the "Beyond The Fringe" comedy group
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from Oxford. A man imitating Bertrand Russell "remembered"
being visited on one occasion by the eminent logician, G.E.
Moore, who was carrying a basket full of apples,
Moore, I said, "do you have some apples in that
basket? "
'
'
"No, " he said.
'
'"Moore," I said, "do you then have any apples in
that basket?"
'
'
"No, " he said .
'"Moore," I said, "do you then have apples in that
basket?"
'
"Yes , " he said .
'
This kind of abstract symbolic form is the in-house
critic of the imagination, just as the imagination is the
permanent subverter of logic. Taken together in their uneasy
union, they constitute our fundamental response to reality:
SYMBOL
concrete
I
kinesthetic, affective
I
imagistic
I
personal, subjective
I
metaphoric in meaning
[
felt
formal
I
rational, analytic
I
conceptual
Iimpersonal, critical
I
univocal in meaning
I
syllogistic
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These are two distinct types of responses, not
duplicate systems. One is not there as a back-up for the
other. Yet they are related. A glance at the two columns
shows how much in contrast they stand to each other, so
that we might be tempted to see them as related only by
opposition, each being able to stand without the other,
each resenting" the other. Indeed, much of our academic
tradition assumes ^ust this opposition, and treats emotion
srid imagination as the natural enemies of disciplined
reason, and vice versa. To the extent that it makes and
acts on that assumption the tradition is epistemologically
and pedagogically invalid.
Jean Piaget has demonstrated repeatedly throughout
his work that the items in the second column develop from
the items in the first. Ha does. not, however, make Jung's
mistake, which we have already discussed, and v/hich can be
restated in our present terms this way: Jung absolutizes
the first column and all but annihilates the second as a
significant factor in our response to reality. He further,
and even more drastically, treats the imagination's metaphors
not as metaphors, but as primary realities. Thus, he makes
of the elements of the first column, not a mode of response
to environment, but the actual environment to which we are
responding. Not only do the archetypal metaphors have veto
power over the concepts and syllogisms of reason, they further-
more have veto power over all the other, lesser metaphors of
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the imagination, so that in effect the archetypal metaphors
cease to be metaphors at all, and become the primary natural
givens of the environment. They usurp the function of real-
ity itself. This is a fundamental error.
It IS an error Piaget does not make. His basic idea
is that our mental functions develop through interactions
with our environment, and that simultaneously the actual
state of our developing mental functions determines what we
can take in of our environment. The first process Piaget
calls accomodation, the second assimilation. They are the
two moments of our mental interaction with environment.
This theory stresses the interrelationship
between the knower and the known in the act
of discovering reality with each element making
a more or less equal contribution. Piaget
consequently acknowledges the importance of
the environment which undoubtedly determines
the development of thought to a certain extent.
Obviously the type of experience he acquires
and the situation to which he is exposed will
channel the child's mental performance. But
they will not determine development entirely
because the child in no instance comes to a
situation with a tabula rasa . He comes with
a mental structure, or accumulation of past
experience in the form of schemes, and these
will influence his apprehension of reality.
This means that for the child reality is not
an objective phenomenon which has its own
independent existence. Reality is determined
by the type of structure with which it is
apprehended. The reality of a 4-year-old
child is not the same as that of a 7-year-old,
nor the same as that of a 14-year-old. Yet
the different "realities" are equally legit-
im.ate, since the things that a 4-year-old
sees and believes are as real to him as the
things a 14-year-old sees and believes. For
a child in the preoperational period, his
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world does, in fact, present the various char-
acteristics which constitute the expressions
of thought of this stage of development. Forhim liguid does indeed change in form as well
as in quantity or size, just as for him a row
of candies does become longer and contain more
when the spatial layout is changed. So Piaget
feels that the role of the knower and the
development of his mental or cognitive struc-
tures is very important in the dual relation-
ship between knower and known. As the one
changes, so does the other. With development
the child acquires a less superficial view
of reality. Knowledge proceeds from the
periphery to the center of reality, but at
each level there is a constant interaction
between the knower and the external world.
The full version of Piaget's theory is quite complex,
and is not made any easier by the elaborate vocabulary he
has couched it in. For our purpose we need deal only with
the core of it. According to him, the main device we use
to accomplish the accomodation-assimilation interaction with
environment is that we imitate the environment. In Piaget's
view, the imitation of it is at first physical and kinesthetic,
then is internalized on the level of concrete imagination,
and finally is completely internalized and abbreviated on the
level of formal concepts. These three main phases of develop-
ment Piaget calls the Sensorimotor Phase, the Phase of Concrete
Operations, and the Phase of Formal Operations . ^
^
At this last stage of "formal operations" the mind at
last comes in to its own, and operates by the rules of its own
^ ^ Ibid
.
,
p . 217
.
^^Cf. J. McV. Hunt, Intelligence and Experience
(N.Y.: Ronald Press Co., 1961), chap. 5 & 6.
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inner logic. Piaget identifies this inner logic with the
sixteen binary operations of two—valved propositional logic,
and with the so-called INRC group of logical operations.
Complex as such a description is, it probably would not be
complex enough for prgponants of symbolic logic. But if
Piaget were to look at our earlier diagram of the two kinds
of symbols he would no doubt call the first column "concrete
operations" and the second "formal operations." He would
further state that the concrete leads to and is assumed into
the formal. Thus:
Concrete operations > Formal operations
kinesthetic, affective — > rational, analytic
imagistic > conceptual
personal, subjective > impersonal, critical
metaphoric in meaning > univocal in meaning
felt > syllogistic
What is more, he speaks of the formal operations as
being essentially adult operations. In this sense, the ado-
lescent is, in Piaget's view, essentially adult since he is
capable of formal propositional logic. But most of Piaget's
American interpreters go on mistakenly to understand him to
mean that therefore the concrete operations are essentially
the childish way of operating, and are immature when done
by an adult. Most of his American followers set things up so
that the relation:
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emotion
: reason
is the same as the relation:
image
: concept;
and that is the same as the relation:
metaphoric meaning : univocal meaning;
that is the same as the relation:
child : adult.
Affective and kinesthetic imitation, imagination, and
metaphor — these are, then, the things of a child. This view
is sometimes attributed to Piaget, along with the view that
the adult is to be defined exclusively in terms of abstract
reason. But Piaget's own viev; is quite different. It is, in
fact, identical with the view of the present study, namely,
that the mind never outgrows concrete symbolism in its thought
processes. The experiential, concrete, personal, subjective
dimensions of thought feed, support, and even correct the
more formal and abstract dimensions. The fullness of the
adult mind, in Piaget's view, requires skill in the use of
the concrete operations, as well as of the formal ones.
It is our contention that Piaget's model of childhood
development is essentially correct, and is in fact a sort of
rigorously formalized common sense. But for some reason, most
of his interpreters in America set up a model of adulthood
that seems to be more a formalized violation of common sense —
not that it is wrong so far as it goes, but that it is so impov-
erished and incomplete. By leaving themselves open to the
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interpretation that the "concrete operations" are immature
and that the "formal" are the only mature ones, they have
in effect struck from the world of adults the fullness of
imaginative, emotive, and imitative life, have given no
importance to adult play, and have put into some closet of
the mind that rich store of fantasy that gives us all our
metaphors and that is the mainspring of all our sciences
and arts. Such a model of the adult mind is not the adult
9-t all, but a residue of it after everything not unigue
to it has been boiled off. But when an adult emerges from
the child he once was, he does not leave everything behind.
Piaget seems to know better than many of his followers that
the adult does not keep the childhood things only as left-
overs or mementoes or vestiges. The adult leaves behind
from childhood only what were not basic life-long skills,
but keeps from childhood the things that were and continue
to be basic skills. Among those things are what Piaget calls
the concrete operations, which, in the adult, are the skills
of creative imagination and metaphoric thought, as important
in science as in art, and as adult as any exercise of formal
logic
.
The double symbolism, concrete and formal, by which
according to Piaget, we transform reality mentally is also the
tool which makes it possible for us to transform it physically .
By means of the double symbolism we own and manipulate the
world. Before the advent of the symbol-making mind of man,
67
the creative initiative in life belonged to nature's triad:
G < > 0 < > En. But somehow — we are still guessing
at the reason and at the mechanism — nature went beyond
itself into mind: (G < > 0 < > En) >R. And now
the initiative is reversed, or at least is no longer so one-
sided as it was: (G < > 0 < > En) < R, Looked at
one way man is nature's creature, looked at another way he
is its creator. By the power of his symbol-making mind he
creates the metaphoric structures (R > m) by which in-
creasingly he influences the very course of nature. Consider:
M
R < > M
stands for structures created by
the mind;
the process within the mind; the
subject of science of psychology;
basic concern of education; the
origins of art;
En<-
0 <•
G <
M a) appropriation of nature by art;
b) appropriation of nature by science;
c) cultural environment created by man
d) sciences by which man studies his
own cultural product;
M all the sciences of the living body;
medicine; comparative anatomy;
zoology; botony; etc
.
;
M the ultimate life-science, genetics;
the point at which life-science and
"natural" science meet at the
molecular level.
That is a sketch of how the mind structures experience
in the making of connections, comparisons, metaphors.
CHAPTER III
THE USES OF METAPHOR
Metaphor is a luatter of taking one thing in terms of
another. It is the making of comparisons. The rhetoricians
of ancient times took rather too much pleasure in distin-
guishing it from other figures of speech (simile, hyperbole,
apostrophe, etc.)
,
and by so doing made it seem as one
verbal trick among many. It is, first, not a trick at all,
but a serious device whereby the mind understands things by
comparing them to each other. Further, it is not exclusively
verbal because comparisons can be made on a visual basis as
well, or auditory, or kinesthetic, etc. Most important,
however, is that the making and using of metaphor is not
one more am.ong the many curious things the mind can do. It
is, together with the ability to think univocally and logi-
cally — that is, non-metaphorically — the most basic mental
skill. By being conceptual and discursive man can be clear
and consistent in his thoughts and his communications. By
being imagistic and associative he can be creative in them.
The subject of metaphoric thought is vast, but it is
intelligible. Perhaps we can introduce it by means of a some-
what elaborate example, but one which nevertheless is clear,
and which illustrates the basic uses of metaphor. Following
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is a passage from Shakespeare's Richard II. ^ The king has
just received a message that Henry Bolingbroke, whom he had
exiled as a traitor, has returned to England with an army
and is at this very hour riding toward the king to overthrow
him. The king responds to this alarming news by saying to
his courtiers
:
...of comfort no man speak.
Let s talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs.
Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes.
Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth.
Let's choose executors and talk of wills--
And yet not so, for what can we bequeath.
Save our deposed bodies to the ground?
Our lands, our lives, and all are Bolingbroke ' s
,
And nothing can we call our own but death;
And that small model of the barren earth.
Which serves as paste, and cover to our bones.
For God's sake let us sit upon the ground,
And tell sad stories of the death of kings.
How some have been deposed, some slain in war.
Some haunted by the ghosts they have deposed,
Some poisoned by their wives, some sleeping killed.
All murdered. For within the hollow crovm
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits.
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp.
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize, be feared, and kill with looks.
Infusing him with self and vain conceit.
As if this flesh which walls about our life
Were brass impregnable; and humored thus.
Comes at the last and with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall, and farewell king!
Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood.
With solemn reverence; throw away respect.
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty.
For you have but mistook me all this while.
I live with bread like you, feel want.
Taste grief, need friends; subjected thus.
How can you say to me
,
I am a king?
^Shakespeare, Richard II, III. ii. 146 ff.
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Images of death (let us call them M^) obviously
dominate the king's mind. Under the circumstances this
is entirely to be expected — except that the images are
of the king's death, not the death of his enemies. Our
expectations are reversed here. Instead of images of
counterattack and self-defense, we get images of despair
and sad resignation — images that prevent the king from
calling on his own capacity to fight back (E < M) . The
Bishop of Carlisle, one of Richard's counsellors, sees what
the problem is, and tries to reverse the king's feelings
by giving a different meaning to the metaphoric images that
express them (M,
)
r
'
My lord, wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes.
But presently prevent the ways to wail.
To fear the foe, since fear oppresseth strength.
Gives in your weakness strength unto your foe.
And so your follies fight against yourself.
Fear and be slain, no worse can come to fight.
And fight and die, is death destroying death.
While fearing dying pays death servile breath.
For the moment at least the king snaps out of his self-pity,
changes his m.etaphors, and accepts the role of attacker and
avenger
.
Let us take a closer look at what work the metaphors
are doing in these passages. First, the metaphors enable the
king to express his overwhelming feeling of being deathbound
(E > M) : nothing can we call our own but death.
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Richard orchestrates these profoundly expressive images
so skillfully that, not only does he manifest his own feel-
ings of mortality, but he expresses for everyone else pres-
ent their feelings of the same thing. Richard sings an
aria here that expresses one of the most universal of human
feelings
.
But he is doing more than just giving a form to
feeling. He is also defining the context of his present
situation. He reads the history books and sees only bleed-
ing monarchs — his predecessors in danger and death. The
universal condition of mortal man is most emphatically the
condition of the king, and death not only will visit him
eventually but it will stalk him every day. Richard defines
the kingly context, which is his own, as. not just death but
murder, not just weakness but victimhood, not just danger
but absolute helplessness. His images, therefore, in
addition to expressing his inward feelings (E > M)
,
also define the public, historical, even cosmic context of
his whole life (E < M) . They therefore pre-structure
how he will experience such bad news as he has. just received;
he can only receive it as a death-knell. He cannot receive
it as a call to arms. The metaphor here preceeds the exper-
ience and determines what it will taste like.
To push the matter further, the image which defines
the context of one’s experience dictates thereby what he can
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^ with that experience. For the course of action one
will take is a function, not so much of his situation
itself, as of how he sees that situation. For Richard
the image of universal kingly assassination makes only
one course of action possible, and it is the one he actu-
ally takes: to sit upon the ground and tell sad stories.
It is not, of course, the only way he could act in the
situation
.
And it is not the way Carlisle will allow him to
act. In his brief speech he manages to reverse the impact
of the king's metaphors ) and therefore at least momen-
2
tarily to alter the course of action. First, images of
death indeed express the inner king, but now it is to be
the king as death-dealer. Secondly, the images of death
do indeed define the context, but it is to be Bolingbroke '
s
context rather than the king's. Accordingly, these reinter
preted images indicate the proper course of action: "And
fight." The bishop suggests alternative metaphors, hence
alternative ways for the king to understand himself and his
policy.
Shakespeare enables us here to see the two funda-
mental functions of metaphor: ^ express inner feeling or
experience, and define the context within which one will
experience new things and make his practical decisions. He
also helps us to see that not all metaphors are equally use
ful for either of these purposes, that some are far too
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limiting and therefore defeating. But he does not lock us
into that defeat. He makes it clear that there are always
alternative possibilities — new metaphors that better
express the inner life, and new metaphors that, because they
better define the context in which we function, yield more
useful approaches to the particular problems we are trying
to solve. There is always a Carlisle worth listening to.
Thus: a) we create metaphoric structures to give
shape to our experience, to express what
being alive in the world has felt like
to us. This is Expressive Metaphor;
E > M.
b) once those metaphors are there, they not
only continue to express our experience
of reality
,
but they also control our
experience of reality. Expressive Meta-
phor structures what we have felt or are
feeling
. Contextual Metaphor pre-struc-
tures what we will experience: E < M.
It thereby also pre-structures what we will
do » For decision-making and problem-solving
are at root matters of setting up contextual
metaphors within which to understand what
we are dealing with.
In this chapter we will investigate the two main functions
of metaphor. For the mind's increasing ability to structure
its experience, to create and to recreate its knowledge, to
control its environment, to extend its influence more and more
through the whole range of being, is the product of making
significant connections, significant metaphors.
Expressive Metaphor
The basic level of experience, after the purely
biological, is emotional. Emotion is the first level
chronologically and epistemologically — of our past, pres-
ent, and future interactions with our world. It belongs
to the phase of the "concrete operations." We "like" what
we contact or we don't; we desire or fear it, hunger for
it, become angry with it. We first know things by knowing
our feelings about those things. Not only do the emotions
supply the energy of human projects, they are, after biology
itself, the infrastructure of human knowledge. More even
than that, they are the first object of that knowledge. To
be aware of his fundamental interactions with his world,
his fundamental experience, man m.ust be able to name his
feeling, to express them to himself and to others in a
so sophisticated it has no root in feeling, so abstract it
does not imply and structure some passion.
iences them, many of those feelings are also shared by others,
and are in that sense public or cultural. And some of the
culturally shared feelings of reality are so deep and embracing
that they constitute a society's most basic and most universal
attitude toward life. Emotional experience, then, can be purely
personal, or cultural , or what v;e will be calling mythic . For
purposes of schematizing we will call these Ej^, E2/ and E^*
2
His knowledge never becomes
Though all feelings are personal to the one who exper-
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All of these dimensions of people's emotional
interactions with reality have to be expressed and struc-
tured in ways appropriate to them. A purely personal
feeling needs no more than a personally meaningful meta-
phor to express it, while a feeling shared widely through-
out a culture needs a metaphor recognized and shared by
that whole culture, and a culturally shared feeling of
the ultimate values and purposes of life needs something
like a full-fledged myth to express it:
(personal) >
^2 (cultural) >
(mythic) >
These, then, are the three levels of expressive
metaphor, whose purpose it is to articulate the emotional
bases of knowledge. In terms of broad influence in struc-
turing the emotional life, metaphors of the mythic type are
clearly the most powerful because they tend to have a kind
of veto power over cultural foms and personal tendencies.
If the base of the triangle stands for the largest influence,
we hav^
:
Mythic
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Still, every expressive metaphor begins as the
creation of some private person, no matter how culturally
sanctioned it may come to be in time. in this sense, all
cultural and all mythic metaphors began their existence
simply as metaphors that were personally meaningful to
someone. We think, for example, of how Christianity has
followed the pattern of the personal experience of St. Paul.
Private metaphors gain a public hold by being as helpful
and meaningful to many other people as they are to their
creators. And they continue to derive their value and their
existence only to the extent that they are personally mean-
ingful. When they fail of that, they become part of the
baggage of history. In terms of ultimate authority and
influence, then, the diagram would look like this:
Clearly, the three kinds of expressive metaphor inter-
penetrate each other. Even to say there are "three kinds"
is no more than a useful fiction. We will use the distinction
to help structure our discussion of expressive metaphor, but
that implies no suggestion that the three categories are
radically distinct from each other.
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I • Personal Expressive Metaphor
There are two kinds of personal expressive metaphor:
the kind psychiatry has paid most of its attention to, and
all the others. The first kind are the pathological meta-
phors one generates that either unconsciously disguise or
create ambiguities about what one is really feeling. The
others are not pathological, and, though they are generally
not fully conscious, they are truly and rather clearly ex-
pressive of what one is feeling.
emotional experience is not clear, and some sort of therapy
may be needed to bring about any degree of clarity. Instead
of E > M, the situation is:
For example, a patient signals his feelings by shrieking at
the doctor. In most cases such a behavioral metaphor means
that the patient does not want the doctor around. But it is
possible, as the following remarks of one of R. D. Laing’s
patients makes clear, that the metaphor is in. fact expressive
of a quite different emotion:
Patients kick and scream and fight when
they're not sure the doctor can see them.
It's a most terrifying feeling to realize
that the doctor can't see the real you,
that he can't understand what you feel and
that he's just going ahead with his own
ideas. I would start to feel that I was
invisible or maybe not there at all. I
In the first, the connection of the metaphor to
appa
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had to make an uproar to see if the doctor
would respond to me, not just to his ownideas .
^
The danger of expressing oneself through patholog-
ically ambiguous metaphors is profound. The metaphor one
uses to express his feeling to others (^1) is, for them,
metaphoric of some other feeling, and they will assume he
must mean what they themselves would mean by the same meta-
• For example, one of Laing's patients "said of
her mother and father that they were not her real parents,
that they were not a husband and wife, or a mother and father,
but simply a pair of business partners. This was taken to
be a delusion. ^ In fact, it was a metaphor that expressed
exquisitely what the daughter felt. The person who seeks to
express his emotion through purely idiosyncratic metaphors
runs a clear risk;
Interviewer ; But do you feel you have to
agree with v/hat most of the people
around you believe?
R^th : Well if I don't I usually end up in
the hospital.
And the chances are good that one will not even be clear to
oneself, so tenuous sometimes is the connection of metaphor
to feeling.
^R. D. Laing, ibid., p. 166.
^R. D. Laing and A. Esterson, Sanity
,
Madness
,
and
the Family (Harmondsworth
,
England: P'enguin Books Ltd.,
1970)
,
p. 77.
''Ibid., p. 175.
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Not all psychiatry deals with the pathological
extremes that Laing does, but all of it deals with per-
sonal metaphors that express one's feelings in an obscure,
encoded manner. Carl Jung spent a career decoding the
mystifying images that swirl around in dreams. And Eric
Berne has done much of his work decoding the often con-
voluted meaning of the metaphoric "games" through which
people deal v/ith each other. Whether in the depths of
dreams or in the nuances of social intercourse, psychiatry
metaphors that are anti—expressive until they are
decoded, but that are highly expressive once the code has
been cracked. Berne describes a "game" in which one person
gets another at a complete disadvantage, pretends to be
solicitous, while actually rubbing salt in wounds:
Thesis : Now I've got you, you son of a bitch.
Aim : Justification.
Roles : Victim, Aggressor.
Dynamics ; Jealous rage.
Examples : (1) I caught you this time.
(2) Jealous husband.
Social paradigm : Adult-adult.
Adult: "See, you have done wrong."
Adult:. "Now that you draw it to my atten-
tion, I guess I have."
Psychological paradigm : Parent-child.
Parent: "I've been watching you, hoping
you'd make a slip."
Child: "You caught me this time."
Parent: "Yes, and I'm going to let you
feel the full force of my fury."^
^Eric Berne, Games People Play (N.Y.
:
1967)
,
p. 86.
Grove Press,
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Here the ambiguity of presented metaphor may be semi-
deliberate, but still it is largely coming out of ob-
scured motives.
Besides those pathological and misguiding meta-
phors which psychiatry exists to decipher and correct,
there is an immense range of genuinely expressive ones
through which people constantly, if informally, define
their feelings for themselves (E > M) and signal each
E, > M, .
other about them ( ^1) • Generally we disregardMp
them as trivial, but we would not consider them altogether
so if we reflected that it is in the area of personal ex-
pressive metaphor that most people make most of the crea-
tive choices of their lives and exercise most of their
sensitivity and intelligence. Although the choice of one's
favorite color, breed of dog, style of dress, music, house,
flower, and friend will not shake the State nor distress
the orbit of Jupiter, it nevertheless is of immense importance
to the man or woman who has such choice to make. For the only
basis on which it can be made is pure personal feeling. The
choice is right if it fits one's emotional being, wrong if it
does not. No other standard applies. We are here in the
world of radical subjectivity, and everyone is in that world
much of the time. However influencea one's feelings may be
by the culture around him, and no matter how much or little
of his own expressive metaphors may be sanctioned by that
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El <
culture ( T^)
,
he is still aware of himself as having
a core of purely private experience (E^)
,
and aware of the
private ways he has of representing it to himself (E > M)
and of building it into the fabric of his life. In circum-
scribed but absolutely authentic ways people express them-
selves by the objects they surround themselves v/ith, the
clothes they like to wear, the jokes they find funny, the
dreams they have for the future and the careers they choose
in the present, the movies they like, their ways of relaxing,
their behavior with money — an all but endless sequence of
small decisions which are based on pure subjectivity and
which, taken together, constitute a single complex expres-
sive metaphor whose purpose is to say, "This is who I am."
It is, indeed, in matters such as these that we can
see most clearly the first pattern of conscious life: the
expression of feeling through significant form. In every
other department of life emotional factors tend to be over-
looked. Scientists say science is objective, observational,
unemotional. Politicians say that they rein in their feel-
ings and remain impartial. Army men like to portray them-
selves as the reasonable agents of reasonable policies. But
if we read the letters of the scientist or the diary of the
politician or eavesdrop as the general talks in his sleep, we
will find more than detached, rational observations arranged
logically around a central pellucid thesis. There is another
core within that core, and it is made of feelings: perhaps
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the scientist's purely emotional need of order, perhaps
the politician's drive to establish and defend personal
territory, perhaps the general's purely subjective taste
for drama and conflict. Such private feelings are not
minor impurities in the otherwise objective worlds of
science, statecraft, and arms. Such feelings are exactly
what gets expressed through the forms supplied by those
worlds. Those great public worlds exist in order to
express just such private feelings.
Insignificant in comparison as one's choice of
clothes may seem, or one's preference in living rooms,
nevertheless these minor matters are one process with
those major ones. And they have the advantage of not
being tricked out as purely rational, objective decisions
that have to be made by accurate men. Everyone concedes
them to be no one else's business but one's own and to
rest on nothing but personal preference. Even allowing for
the influence of dress codes and shifting norms of fashion,
here fantasy and feeling are allowed -- allowed, perhaps,
within- limits, but allowed. Here people can rearrange much
of their immediate world until it is the color and shape
they want it to be. It may even be that in our present
culture these apparently insignificant choices constitute
the first and, as yet, the only school of expressive metaphor.
Elsev/here we may be unwilling to admit we are indulging in
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the metaphoric revelation of feelings, but here we can
acknowledge it and practice it for its own sake. More-
over, it is entirely possible that an individual will
never know what the range of his own feelings is until
he has tried out a range of metaphors as potential expres-
of them. As we have said earlier, one's experience
is not uniform, and neither are the metaphors that struc-
ture it. People need to be able to try out alternative
personal metaphors, not for the sake of novelty, but for
the sake of possessing increasingly their own lives.
II . Cultural Expressive Metaphor
Very much the same process goes on in societies as
in individuals. The individual expresses and defines his
experience through metaphoric structures (M^)
,
and so do
cultures (^2^ • Indeed, a metaphor becomes cultural only
because many people have found it to be expressive of how
they personally feel.
Immediately however we run into a complication here.
The cultural metaphor may be not so much expressing people's
feelings (E > M) as controlling
,
or setting up, people's
feelings (E < M) . Looked at one way, a cultural meta-
phor is the metaphorized product of shared feeling. Looked
at another way those feelings are the product of the cultural
metaphor. In the first case we are dealing with expressive
metaphor, in the second with contextual metaphor. As the
metaphor becomes more and more widely accepted as meaningful
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It loses its idiosyncratic quality and its roots in uniquely
personal experience, it automatically becomes more and more
normative, in the way described by Dr
. R. j. Kaufmann:
Metaphor is... that particular phase of
symbolic activity which directs attentiondelimits reference, and relates private
'
desire to p^ublic necessity
. Metaphor isto^the need for codified or normalized
values
,
to public ways of seeing andfeeling, what lav;s are to sciences andgeneral concepts are to discursive think-ing. Metaphor simplifies what would other-
wise be too complex to evolve a normative
response
. (Emphasis mine.) ^ —
Sometimes it is exceedingly difficult to determine
whether a cultural metaphor is following public feeling or
leading it, expressing or shaping it. The question is more
than academic, for to the extent that such metaphor is no
longer generated out of felt experience but rather is only
generati^ pseudo-experience, it is a dead metaphor, at best
a piece of flotsam from a dead cause, at worst a shrinking and
strangling of people's lives.
In the following section we will try to suggest how
cultural metaphors express collective feelings. Later, under
the title of Contextual Metaphor, v/e will discuss briefly how
they manipulate it, sometimes for profit and sometimes for los
We look briefly now at law, art, and science as expres
sive metaphors. There are of course other levels that would
^R. J. Kaufmann, "Metaphorical Thinking and the Scope
of the 7\rts," College English
,
XXX (October 1968), p. 42.
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illustrate cultural expressive metaphor. These three are
only illustrative of the point.
(a) Law as Expressive Metaphor
Few countries illustrate as clearly as the United
States the expressive function of law. The reason is that
most nations cannot find the single, definitive moment at
which they sat down and decided what their legal system would
be. They have a harder time than the USA of saying, This is
our law. Americans can and do point to their Constitution
as being their national self-expression in the form of law.
Looked at as cultural expressive metaphor, as being
the structuring of shared emotions, the Constitution is a
fascinating document. For not only does it express the unity
of our feelings, it also expresses their disunity. It quite
frankly acknov;ledges and sanctions the thirst for power and
for aggressive competition so enjoyed among us. It does
nothing to sweeten that beast. On the contrary, the Constitution
expresses everyone '
s
desire for power, to an extent that few
legal systems have ever done.
But it also expresses the opposite desire for harmony
and family feeling in the nation. It is not romantic about do-
ing so, however. The "family feeling" it expresses is not par-
ticularly tender. This is to be a family of competitors — no
ov- ' whe lining father-figure here (such as a king disguised as
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president )
,
no overwhelming mother-figures (such as a
^3-tiorial church)
,
but no endless fratricidal struggle for
the power of the deposed parents either: so far as possible,
a piece of the pie for everybody. America was (and is) a
tense family, and expressed itself as such in its first law.
The Constitution expresses too our very mixed feel-
ings both about government and about individualism. By its
careful ground rules it sets up a very strong, clever,
practical form of government. And then, by the Bill of Rights,
that afterthought, it all but takes away from that govern-
ment all the traditional powers of government. But while
granting to the individual so much autonomy, it nevertheless
sanctions slavery, and, by means of such devices as the
Electoral College, stays very far away from anything like a
direct democracy. Indeed, the makers of the Constitution
expressed the tensions within our collective feelings so well
that they even risked miring the law in sheer contradiction.'
The development of the Supreme Court as defender-
interpreter of the Constitution is the most striking indica-
tion of the enduring American wish to maintain -the law's
character as expressive metaphor. The Court has no function
other than to keep the national laws, institutions, and behavior
as far as possible expressive of the basic national sentiments
that have been approximately
,
usefully
,
but not definitively
expressed through the text of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court is there to see that the metaphor continues to be expressive.
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(t>) Art as Expressive Metaphor
Art is another kind of cultural expressive metaphor.
Whether art is viewed as the expression of the individual
artist s, or as the collected shared expression of the members
of a culture and it can be viewed both ways, — it depends
for its expressiveness on the clarity of its metaphoric form.
is expression, but, as Susanne Langer points out, "Sheer
self-expression requires no artistic form."^ "Art," she says
elsewhere, "is the creation of forms symbolic of human feel-
ing
.
" ®
Mrs. Langer has written extensively on the arts from
this point of view. She first formulated her key idea in terms
of music specifically:
...music is not self-expression, but
formulation and representation of emotions,
moods, mental tensions and resolutions—
a
"logical picture" of sentient, responsive
life, a source of insight, not a plea for
sympathy. Feelings revealed in music are
essentially not "the passion, love or long-
ing of such-and-such an individual," invit-
ing us to put ourselves in that individual's
place, but are presented directly to our
understanding, that we may grasp, realize,
comprehend these feelings, without pretend-
ing to have them or imputing them to anyone
else. Just as words can describe events we
have not witnessed, places and things we
have not seen, so music can present emotions
and moods we have not felt, passions we did
^Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (N.Y.:
Mentor Books, 1951), p. 184.
^Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (N.Y.: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 40.
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not know before. its subject-matter is
the same as that of "self-expression,"
and its symbols may even be borrowed,
upon occasion, from the realm of expres-
sive symptoms; yet the borrowed sugges-
tive elements are formalized, and the
subject-matter "distanced" in an artistic
perspective .
^
Later, beautifully summarizing this first step of her now
expanded theory, she v/rote
:
The tonal structures we call "music"
bear a close logical similarity to the
forms of human feeling—forms of growth
and of attenuation, flowing and stowing,
conflict and resolution, speed, arrest,
terrific excitement, calm, or subtle
activation and dreamy lapses—not joy
and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy
of either and both—the greatness and
brevity and eternal passing of every-
thing vitally felt. Such is the pattern,
or logical form, of sentience; and the
pattern of music is that same form worked
out in pure, measured sound and silence.
Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.
Such formal analogy, or congruence
of logical structures, is the prime
requisite for the relation between a sym-
bol and v;hatever it is to mean. The sym-
bol and the object symbolized must have
some common logical form.^®
The "congruence of logical structures": the form of
a work of art is congruent with the processes of one's emotions.
Art differs from what we have called personal expressive meta-
phor in its much heavier emphasis on form. And it is by reason
of that same form that art can be publicly expressive as well
as personally so. The "logical structure" of a work of art is
'^Langer, Key
,
p. 188.
^^Langer, Form
,
p. 27.
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congruent not only with the artist's own emotional proc-
esses, but with that of many other people as well. The
artist expresses himself, but the art work expresses more
than himself. it expresses also anyone else whose emotions
are congruent" with the form the artist has created. That
is why we do not have to be a culture of practicing artists
for art to be a metaphor expressive of us.
(c) Science as Expressive Metaphor
We have been discussing how a culture builds both
its public institutions and its art around the principle of
expressive metaphor. But we said at the beginning of this
part of our discussion that science, too, that most objective-
seeming thing, can be seen under this same rubric. Science
itself has a root in feeling, and is one of the forms through
which feeling is expressed.
Science is commonly thought of as a matter of gather-
ing facts, connecting them, drawing logical conclusions from
them. But which facts will be gathered, which will be connected
to which and how and why, and toward what conclusions their
combinations will be applied, these are matters not at all of
fact but of preference, in other v/ords, of subjectivity. Science
is evidence, but it is evidence used very largely as a servant
of feeling.
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W© will exemplify this idea through the famous
problem of whether the earth or the sun stands at the
center of things, or neither. To a great extent all the
ways of answering the question can be defended by observ-
able facts. An enormous number of everyday observations
confirms the view that the earth is rather flat and per-
fectly static, and that everything in the heavens revolves
around it. There also is a great number of less apparent
but equally unarguable observations that go toward proving
that the sun as it the center. And, as of Einstein's
General Relativity Theory, the whole question becomes
irrelevant. Seen from a higher ground it makes no differ-
ence at all.
But the facts pure and simple which were offered as
evidence were never enough to establish geocentrism, helio-
centrism, or relativity. Fore each of these systems also
is metaphorized emotion, and therein has been much of their
power. Geocentrism expresses in a cosmological way the
culture-wide feeling that the human world is the central,
definitive one; that all powers are powers either for or
against man; that the surrounding order of nature is the
vehicle of the gods' concern for man; that all creation is
there to supply a home for man. That feeling, even more than
the observed facts, has been at the root of the theoretical
geocentrism of an earlier time and of the practical geocen-
trism of our own time.
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The system was changed partly because of altered
observations of fact, but largely also because of altered
feeling. Newton rearranged the solar system partly for
reasons of mechanics and mathematics, but also for reasons
of emotionally expressive symbolism. The sun, emblematic
of God, ought to be in the center, and the world's human
and infra-human orders ought properly to revolve around it.
It is no secret that Newton was a profoundly religious man, not
to say a mystic:
Late in his life he wrote, discussing the
Creator at the end of his book Opticks
,
'Such a wonderful uniformity in the Planetary
System must be allowed the Effect of Choice,'
that is, it must be admitted to come about
by design and not by chance. That v/as his
belief throughout his life.^^
If the planetary system is the creation of the Christian deity,
why should it not be so constructed as to include Christian
symbolism? It is known that Newton's religious feelings led
him to draw conclusions about things long before there was
either evidence or logic enough to warrant them:
...his friend, John Craig, a distinguished
but somewhat eccentric mathematician...,
says that (Newton) was much more concerned
with his inquiries into religion than into
science, and that the reason that he showed
the errors in Descartes' scheme was that he
thought it was used as a foundation for
disbelief . ^ ^
^
.N. da C. Andrade
,
Sir Isaac Newton (N.Y.
:
Anchor Books, 1954), p. 36.
^ ibid
.
,
p . 12 0.
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Newton likewise knew what his model of the solar system
would be before he could either explain or prove it, and
in part he "knew" it because it corresponded to his reli-
gious feeling. The heliocentric theory is not, of itself,
expressive metaphor; but in large part it began that way.
Finally, Einstein, who felt that neither traditional
man nor traditional God stood at the center of the universe,
had therefore no emotional stake in either the geocentric
or the heliocentric model. Einstein saw science itself,
not the cosmos, as the reflector of man:
Einstein regards all physical concepts as
free creations of the human mind. Science
is a creation of the human mind, a free
invention. This freedom is restricted
only by our desire to fit the increasing
wealth of our experiences better and better
into a more and more logically satisfactory
scheme . ^ ^
If we are to find the non-f actual, emotive core of
Einstein's science — that element of free creation -- we
look to the world of private fantasy:
Einstein told me how, since his boyhood, he
thought about the man running after the
light ray and the man closed in a falling
elevator. The picture of the man running
after the light ray led to special rela-
tivity theory. The picture of the man in
a falling elevator led to general relativ-
ity theory . ^
^
^Leopold Infeld, Albert Einstein (N.Y.: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 121.
1 4 Ibid
. ,
p . 48.
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Few theories in the history of science have been so frankly
and boldly metaphoric as those of Einstein.
Not only the purely private world, but also the much
larger cultural one is built up around the unending attempt
to give adequate form to feeling, and, by the changing of
metaphoric forms, to give feeling fuller range. But even
larger in scope than either the personal or the cultural,
sometimes overruling them, always influencing them, is the
most powerful expressive metaphor of all; Myth.
Ill
. Mythic Expressive Metaphor
When we use the word "myth" colloquially we usually
mean something false, ill-conceived, prejudiced. That myths,
like any other product of the mind, can lead us into gross
error is of course true. But it was not invented to lead
us into error. It was invented to lead us out of it.
Philosophers like Cassirer and Langer and scholars like
Mircea Eliade seem agreed that the fundamental stratum of
mental activity is the making of myths, and seem further agreed
that its purpose is to organize man's experience at a very
basic level. The characters and plots found in the great
myths are elucidations of something. Myths express man's
first underotanding of himself. Myth is, first, the expression
of v;hat it is like to have a human mind, and, second, of what
it is like to have a human body.
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First, myth expresses the power of mind, the power
of naming and structuring things. Ernst Cassirer sees
both language and myth as having here very similiar functions:
Language moves in the middle kingdom
between the "indefinite" and the "infinite";
it transforms the indeterminate into a
determinate idea, and then holds it within
the sphere of finite determinations. So
there are, in the realm of mythic and reli-
gious conception, "inef fables" of different
order, one of which represents the lower
limit of verbal expression, the other the
upper limit; but between these bounds, which
are drawn by the very nature of verbal expres-
sion, language can move with perfect freedom,
and exhibit all the wealth and concrete
exemplification of its creative power.
Here, again, the mythmaking mind exhibits
a sort of consciousness of the relationship
between its product and the phenomenon of
language, though characteristically it can
express this relationship not in abstract
logical terms, but only in images. It
transforms the spiritual dawn which takes
place v;ith the advent of language into an
objective fact, and presents it as a
cosmogonic process.
The creation myths, then, are metaphoric of the origins
of mind
,
though literally about the origins of world. "In
the beginning v;as The Word." World is there, but it is chaos
without mind. It is the function of the mind, whether that'
of the gods or of men, to name things and in the naming to
confer upon them a new kind of existence, a place in a pattern
of meaning.
^
^Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (N.Y.: Dover
Publications Inc., 1953), p. 81.
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Creation myths are about the origins of a humanly
meaningful cosmos, the emergence of the mind from an ear-
lier chaos and muteness into a new realm where everything
is reconstituted. Carl Jung describes beautifully the
ancient mythic theme as the still fresh, still central
experience of a modern man:
From Nairobi we used a small Ford to
visit the Athi Plains, a great game preserve.
From a low hill in this broad savanna a
magnificent prospect opened out to us. To
the very brink of the horizon we saw gigantic
herds of animals: gazelle, antelope, gnu,
zebra, warthog, and so on. Grazing, heads
nodding, the herds moved forward like slow
rivers. There was scarcely any sound save
the melancholy cry of a bird of prey. This
was the stillness of the eternal beginning,
the world as it had always been, in the
state of non-being; for until then no one
had been present to know that it was this
world. I walked away from my companions
until I had put them out of sight, and
savored the feeling of being entirely alone.
There I was now, the first human being to
recognize that this was the world, but who
did not know that in this moment he had first
really created it.
There the cosmic meaning of consciousness
became overwhelmingly clear to me. "What
nature leaves imperfect, the art perfects,"
say the alchemists. Man, I, in an invisible
act of creation put the stamp of perfection
on the world by giving it objective existence.
This act we usually ascribe to the Creator
alone, without considering that in so doing
we view life as a machine calculated down
to the last detail, which, along with the
human psyche, runs on senselessly, obeying
foreknown and predetermined rules. In such
a cheerless clockwork fantasy there is no
drama of man, world, and God; there is no
"new day" leading to "new shores," but only
the dreariness of calculated processes.
My old Pueblo friend came to my mind. He
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thought that th© iraison d'©tir© of his pu©blohad boen to h©lp thsir fathor, th© sun, to
cross th© sky ©ach day. I had ©nvi©d him
for th© fulln©ss of moaning in that b©li©f,
and had b©©n looking about without hop© for
a myth of our own. Now I know what it was,
and know ©von mor© : that man is indisponsabl©
for th© complotion of croation; that, in fact,
h© himsolf is th© socond croator of the world,
who alon© has given to th© world its objective
existence—without which, unheard, unseen,
silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads
nodding through hundreds of millions of years,
it would have gone on in the profoundest
night of non-being down to its unknown end.
Human consciousness created objective existence
and meaning, and man found his indispensable
place in the great process of being.
We can say, then, that the creation myths in general
are metaphors that express the new-found power of the mind,
a power that in the first place resides in the mind's ability
to make language and thereby to make intelligible the random
flow of things. At the risk of oversimplifying -- but not
by very much — we can also say that the other myths which
do not deal v;ith the creation of a humanly significant
world but with how things work out there after that creation,
are myths that express the power of the human body. More
exactly, they express the power of the human bodies : physical,
social, and affective.
First, as Mrs. Langer has said, myth is:
G. Jung, Memories
,
Dreams
,
and Reflections
(N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1963), p .• 255.
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built on the most primitive symbol — the
body (just as most of our descriptive
language is based on the symbolism of head
and foot, leg and arm, mouth, neck, back,
etc.: the "foothills" of a range, the
mountain's "shoulder," the "leg" of a tri-
angle, the "bottleneck," the "headland,"
etc.). This envisagement of the v;orld as
a realm of individual living forces, each
a being with desires and purposes that
bring it into conflict with other teleo-
logically directed powers, is really the
key idea of all mythical interpretations:
the idea of the Spirit World.
The economy of creation is seen mythically as a system of
vital interplays similar to those within the human body.
On this level, myth is metaphor expressive of what it feels
like to be physical man.
On another level it is also metaphor expressive of
what it feels like to have a social body. The society of
gods in The Iliad
,
for instance, is in fact indistinguish-
able in its form from the society of the man (men?) who
wrote The Iliad . Robert Graves has pointed out repeatedly
the connections between myths and the human body politic,
the marriages and divorces of particular gods corresponding
most curiously to the alliances and wars of particular
nations, etc. Myths are sociology written on the skies.
Some people claim to trace in the voyages of Ulysses a
metaphorized version of the voyage from a barbaric existence
to the civilized high Greek way.
1 7Langer, Form
,
p. 188.
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And on still another level, embracing all the
others, myth is metaphor expressive of that inner body,
the organic world of the feelings. Once their genius had
invented Aphrodite, men could conjure up her image and
thenceforth objectify and understand the joys and caprices
of their own love. Once genius invented Ares, men had
only to imagine him to see the terrible and thrilling aspects
of their own private and public aggressiveness. Or, in
their imaginations they had only to look at Gilgamesh chas-
ing after the riddle of death to comprehend the dark over-
whelming feelings that possess many an individual and some-
times confuse v/hole cultures. Myth is a system for naming
the emotions. It expresses the way men in different times
and places have pictured to themselves what it feels like
to be alive in this particular world. "Before man thinks
in terms of logical concepts, he holds his experiences by
means of clear, separate, mythical images." Through myth,
man sets up images of himself, of his mind, of his body, of
his cosmic situation as it feels to him. Sometimes, as in
Homer and St. John, those images reach such a degree of
completeness and inner consistency, and answer so much to
what many men feel, that they become absolutely authoritative.
Myth, according to Jerome Bruner:
^^Cassirer, ibid., p. 37.
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is at once an external reality and the
resonance of the internal vicissitudes
of man ... .Myth
,
insofar as it is fit-
ting, provides a ready-made means of
externalizing human plight by embodying
and representing them in storied plot
and character.
Our experience of our own minds and of our own
bodies may not be identical to that of ancient man, but
we as much as he need ways to project and metaphorize it.
We need, if not myth exactly, something that will do the
same work for us it did for the fathers.
V7e have been able only to suggest the immense range
of expressive metaphor (E > M)
,
from purely personal
to cultural to mythic. But hopefully it has been established
that metaphor is the major device by which emotional mean-
ings are expressed and defined on all levels of experience.
We turn now to another work that metaphor does: the pre-
structuring of experience (E < M)
.
Contextual Metaphor
Understanding things is mostly a matter of seeing
them in a context, seeing them within some kind of pattern.
Something isolated, disconnected, without context, has no
meaning. It will, though, provoke curiosity and prompt a
search for meaning, as discrepancies between the calculated
^^Jerome S. Bruner, On Knowing (N.Y.: Atheneum,
1969)
,
p. 31.
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and the observed orbits of the planets once did. Confronted
with a maverick fact or event, the mind seeks a context
within which the fact or event will make sense, lose its
isolation, fit the pattern. The establishment of such a
context is one of the. works of metaphor. One thing is seen
within the pattern of another, the characteristics of one
are transferred to the other.
Car manufacturers know this well. They do not merely
present a new car to the public; they present it in a meta-
phoric context of their own choosing that will "define" the
car the way they want. The car is pictured against a sunset,
a lavish home, a romantic couple. Even the car's name is
chosen with an eye to metaphoric context. The car is named
after a powerful and graceful animal (Cougar, Impala, Wildcat,
Mustang)
,
or after an almost mythical pleasure spot (Monterey,
Montego, even El Dorado)
,
or, increasingly nowadays, after
something small, charming, harmless (Cricket, Pinto, Gremlin).
Both the background and the name are metaphors that supply a
context and therefore a considerable freight of meaning to
something that is, otherv/ise, just an out-priced piece of
moderately well made machinery.
By metaphors we define the things we see, or rather,
define how we shall see them. For example, athletics is a
major source of the metaphors that help many people define
situations they find themselves in. We speak of the market-
i-.:'^ game, of the mating game, of "playing to win," of keeping
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an eye on the ball, of being resigned to reversals because
it s all part of the game," of making ball—park estimates,
etc. Seeing business dealings, marriage, etc., metaphorically
in terms of athletics puts them into the context of struc-
tured competitions, of controlled tensions, of victories
hoped for and defeats feared — and, too, of ultimate illu-
sion and indifference because, after all, it's "only a game."
The contextual metaphor defines how we see what we see.
It is readily evident that contextual metaphor is
related to expressive, in that it too is often — always? —
based on feelings. But its purpose is not so much to define
what one feels as what and how one sees. We can distinguish
both functions in the following example. If I meet a man
and feel he is little more than an inert. and useless mass,
I will express my feeling by calling him metaphorically
"a clod." But immediately the metaphor that has expressed
my emotion also begins to control the way I understand
everything about the man. Not only are my feelings defined
by the metaphor, so is the man. If I have defined this man
as a clod and then hold too tightly to that metaphor, I
may continue to express the reality of my feelings accurately
enough, but I am no longer accurately defining the reality
of the man. I am defining, however, how I see him. The meta-
phor is doing two distinct works here, one to express emotion,
the other to define context.
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Once it is there, an expressive metaphor tends
almost at once to become a contextual metaphor. The way
a person or a culture has structured experience (E > m)
in the past is also extremely likely to be the way that
person or culture is pre-structuring it (E < m) for the
future. Indeed, it is the very function of contextual
metaphor to set up what one's experience of something will
be, even before he has experienced it, and even regardless
of whether this way of setting it up should turn out to be
profitable in action or not. Contextual metaphors tend to
be established more or less automatically, not as the result
of a conscious decision, still less after a great deal of
thought. Still, because of their influence on what people
will experience and do they are obviously of such extraor-
dinary importance they should not be left to chance.
The economist Dr. Kenneth Boulding describes the
impact of unconsciously accepted contextual metaphors in
the field of political life;
These symbolic images are of great impor-
tance in political life, and especially in
international relations. We think of . the
United States, for instance, as Uncle Sam;
of England as John Bull; or of Russia as a
performing bear. These symbolic images are
particularly important in the summation
and presentation of value images. Value
images do not usually consist of a long and
detailed list of alternatives in a care-
fully compiled rank-order. They consist,
rather, of a "posture" which in a sense
summarizes an extremely complex network
of alternatives and situations. In
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Christianity, for instance, the symbol of
the Crucifix or of tne Virgin has exercised
an enormous evocative power through the cen~
turies because of the way in which these
symbols summarize a whole value system, a
whole attitude toward life and the universe.
Political images do the same thing at a
^iffsrent level. The creators of these
symbolic images exercise quite extraordinary
power over the imaginations of men and the
course of events. Consider, for example,
the pov;er of the image of the political
party in the United States. The Republican
Party is conceived as an elephant, rather
old, rather dignified, a little slow, not
perhaps terribly bright, but with a good
deal of wisdom, hard working, full of
integrity, rather conservative, a little
isolated from the world around him, patient,
thick-skinned, but capable of occasional
inarticulate squeals of rage. The Demo-
cratic Party is thought of as a donkey,
active, agile, clever, a little unsure of
himself, a bit of an upstart, quick, sen-
sitive, a little vulgar, and cheerfully
absurd. These images are reiterated by
cartoons and have been of great importance
in establishing the political climate.
In international relations, the symbolic
image of the nation is of extraordinary
importance. Indeed, it can be argued that
it has developed to the point where it has
become seriously pathological in its extreme
form. The national symbol becomes the object
of a kind of totem-worship. Cartoons and
political speeches continually reinforce the
image of roles of nations as "real" person-
alities— lions, bears, and eagles, loving,
hating, embracing, rejecting, quarreling,
fighting. By these symbols, the web of
conflict is visualized not as a shifting,
evanescent, unstable network of fine indi-
vidual threads but as a simple tug-of-war
between large opposing elements. This
symbolic image is one of the major causes
of international warfare and is the prin-
cipal threat to the survival of our pres-
ent world . ^ ^
2<^Kenneth Boulding, The Image (University of
Michigan Press, 1969), p. 110.
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Not only does collective emotion find images through
which to express and define itself, but also those images,
once set up, condition and even control the available range
of any further collective emotion. We are limited not so
much in our feelings themselves as in the images that express-
control them. We first set up images of what reality has
felt like to us, and then we make sure that reality will
imitate those images. What starts off as expressive metaphor
becomes a contextual one. Nature does imitate art, just as
Oscar Wilde said it did. Or, as Dr. Kaufmann has put it with
more elaboration and less wit:
Culturally determined metaphors ... act as
a means of self -definition for individuals
and groups; they establish useful equations
betv^een crucial moral abstractions and
available visual experience ... .The most
profound social creativity consists in the
invention of new, radical metaphors; it
also and more often consists of adapting
old metaphors to the current energies of a
culture . 2 ^
Potentially the most important -- because the most
positive — of all the contextual metaphors that impinge on
us from our culture are the arts. They are far more stable,
more carefully structured, more responsibly conceived than
the frequently jingoistic metaphors supplied by politics.
Art insofar as it structures and clarifies feelings is ex-
pressive metaphor par excellence . And art, insofar as it makes
up the cultural tradition of how to structure emotion, is
contextual metaphor par excellence
.
As Mrs. Danger has said:
J. Kaufmann, ibid., p. 46.
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...art penetrates deep into personal lifebecause in giving form to the world, it artic-
ulates human nature: sensibility, energypassion, and mortality. More than anything
else in experience, the arts mold our actualife of feeling. This creative influence is
a more important relation between art and
contemporary life than the fact that motifs
are derived from the artist's environment.
Surely, art is rooted in experience; but
experience, in turn, is built up in memory
and preformed in imagination according to
the intuitions of powerful artists, often
long dead (it takes time for an influence
to reach the deepest strata of mentality,
and what we learn in childhood, never to
lose again, always stems from an earlier
age)
,
more rarely prophets in our own
generation
.
Artistic training is, therefore, the edu-
cation of feeling, as our usual schooling
in factual subjects, and logical skills such
as mathematical "figuring" or simple argu-
mentation (principles are hardly ever ex-
plained)
,
is the education of thought. Few
people realize that the real education of
emotion is not the "conditioning" effected
by social approval and disapproval, but the
tacit, personal, illuminating contact with
symbols of feeling. Art education, therefore,
is neglected, left to chance, or regarded as
a cultural veneer. People who are so concerned
for their children's scientific enlightenment
that they keep Grimm out of the library and
Santa Claus out of the chimney, allow the
cheapest art, the worst of bad singing, the
most revolting sentimental fiction to impinge
on the children's minds all day and every day,
from infancy. If the rank and file of youth
grows up in emotional cowardice and confusion,
sociologists look to economic conditions or
family relations for the cause of this deplorable
"human weakness," but not to the ubiquitous
influence of corrupt art, which steeps the average
mind in a shallow sentimentalism that ruins what
germs of true feeling might have developed in it.
Only an occasional devotee of the arts sees the
havoc, as for instance Percy Buck, who remarked,
nearly thirty years ago:
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"There seems to be complete indifference,
at all events in England .whether the
emotional side of a man is developed in any
way at all. The one and only conviction an
Englishman has about emotion is that you
should learn, as early as possible, to sup-
press it entirely."
"...what exercise should be
. to the physical
side of our lives, religion to our moral, and
learning to our intellectual side, this can
art be, and nothing else but art, to our emo-
tional side."^^
We can see, too, the impact of contextual metaphor on
the development of science. During the medieval centuries
when things were seen in a purely religious v/ay, the world
was considered to have no abiding reality of its own, hence
only a passing interest on its own. It was mostly a sacra-
mental universe, a suggestion and adumbration of the higher
world. The natural cosmos was a metaphor expressive of God's
glory and power. Man and his society were the rough natural
materials from v^hich was made the Church, which was a meta-
phor or sacrament of Christ. And Christ was a metaphor or
sacrament of God. The Scriptures were a book, and Nature v;as
a book, and they were both books about God. The only thing
that was "really real" in this metaphoric universe was of course
God himself. He alone was not a metaphor. It is a magnificent
conception, that opened up some intellectual possibilities and
closed off others. It inspired exquisite poetry, music,
architecture. It laid down the broad lines of society and
^^Langer, Form
,
p. 401.
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explained the purposes of history and of individual life.
But at the same time, it was impossible in such a world
for science to develop. Science can develop only if this
present world is worth looking at for its own sake, and if
it can be understood without reference to metaphors that
transcend it in content and scope. The emergence of science
requires seeing the world in a different metaphoric context
than that of the Middle Ages.
J. H. Randall23 traces the development of modern
science against the background of the West's shifting myths
and metaphors, although he does not use those particular
terms. In his analysis, the Renaissance changed the medieval
^^ythology only to the extent that it made the universe and
everything in it metaphoric of man instead of metaphoric of
God. All things were humanized. But even so, the world was
still largely understood as metaphoric of something other
than itself. Randall concludes that in this sense the
Renaissance, far from being the beginning of the modern world,
was really the last phase of the medieval one.
In the 17th and 18th Centuries, however, such romantic
metaphors collapsed altogether among most learned men. Men
no longer looked at the world in order to see the fabulous
Something Else beyond it, but to see the universe itself.
Instead of being a metaphor, the- world became something to be
H. Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, n.d.).
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understood through a metaphor. The mind of the age being
clock crazy, people more or less naturally began to see
the universe as a huge clock. They set up a new contextual
metaphor, that defined the world in terms of the mechanics
of movement. And therein lay the beginning of what we would
be willing to call science. Science did not begin with the
collapse of metaphor, but with the collapse of certain kinds
of metaphors that were inimical to it and with the creation
of new metaphors that favored it.
The process of scientific development against shifting
metaphors does not stop there, however. As Randall points out,
the clock metaphor was ideal for the emerging physical sciences
of the 17th and 18th Centuries. But it was deadly for the
social and psychological sciences that were also having their
difficult birth at that time. Not until the theory of evolu-
tion in the 19th Century v;as the model for scientific explana-
tion of phenomena changed from a mechanical one to a biological
one, thereby rendering the mechanical model insufficient as
the sole determining metaphor of all science.
Such is the determining power of contextual metaphor
over the further development of thought, its power to focus
the mind on the world in a particular way. We wish to extend
Randall's analysis farther than he himself does, however.
Psychiatry in its modern version was born in the late 19th
Century, when the underlying metaphor of the physical sciences
;, -ALinued to be that of the machine, and of the non-physical
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sciences that of the evolving biological organism. Now,
one of the sciences that deal with living organisms is that
of medicine. The nascent science of psychiatry based itself
on a medical model; it understood mental problems as being
essentially the same as biological ones, with the consequence
that "patients" were understood as "sick" and in need of a
"doctor" and of his "treatments." Psychiatry, like medicine,
was to be a science of the pathologies of organisms. The
contextual metaphor involved here is obviously very powerful
and creative; at the least, it takes mental problems out of
the realm of ethics and morals where they had festered for
so long. But it ^ a metaphor, and hence is both helpful
and limiting. Just as the social sciences were originally
both inspired and crippled by the prevailing metaphor of
the clock, so psychiatry was both inspired and crippled by the
metaphor of disease. In our own day efforts are being made
to change the contextual metaphor, to stop viewing psychiatry
as an extension of biological medicine.
From the examples we have given, it should be clear
that the most creative moment in the process of thinking about
anything is the moment in which one sets up the basic contextual
metaphors within which he will do any further thinking on the
subject. Creativity in any field is essentially the capacity
to view an old thing in a new way, and contextual metaphor is
the tool through which the definition of viewpoint is accomplished.
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But contextual metaphors, once established, have a
way of lasting longer than their usefulness and of being
applied rigidly even when they are inappropriate. Viewing
a man exclusively and rigidly as "a clod" is, after a point,
no longer to look at the man at all. it is to look only at
the metaphor itself and to substitute it for the reality.
When the metaphor is no longer taken as the way one sees,
but as the thing one sees — when, that is, it is no longer
considered to be a metaphor at all — it becomes a tyrant
structure that makes impossible any new approaches to exper-
ience. It is then the ectcskeleton of thought, an armor
the outside world and the prison of the inner one.
We have been speaking of the role of contextual meta-
phor in rather grand things such as politics, art, and science.
But there is another, more daily, more immediately practical
use for it which we will consider now. It is the role of
contextual metaphor in problem-solving and decision-making.
We know that many specific problems have been moved
toward solution by someone's pausing to notice that "this"
is very much like "that," and that if I take "this" in the
light of "that" I might get a better grasp of it. The man
who has never mixed cement before but whose hobby is cooking
might transfer metaphorically what he knows about mixing flour
to cement. The man who knows mathematics can, if he chooses
to make the jump, find he already knows a great deal about
music; for, although music is not mathematics nor a branch of
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it, still it can be taken "as though" it were. Or, again,
the man who knows the feel of angling for a fish might call
on the same feeling when he plays a game of cards or does
business. Or again, Rutherford solved the problem of how
to explain the atomic. particles of matter by arguing by
analogy from the structure of the solar system. In each
case the solution to a particular problem has been achieved
t>y the conscious or unconscious use of metaphor.
The process of solving problems creatively is essen-
tially a matter of making one's experience in one area work
for him in another. It is a matter of selecting something
from one's past knowledge and experience that v;ill serve as
the context that defines how one will view a present problem.
The problem-within-problems is this matter of establishing
metaphorical context. Confronted v/ith a new problem, one's
tendency is to react in a double way. On the one hand, one
is fearful of the problem as being something unprecedented
in his experience, outside the boundaries of what he knows.
This feeling of newness can excite either a sense of challenge
among the courageous, or a sense of automatic defeat among
the timid. On the other hand, one equally feels when faced
with a new problem that his store of previous experience ought
to help him somehow at this juncture, that there is an under-
lying unity somewhere hidden in the diversities of the past
that ought to stand him in good stead now. On the one hand
f. eling of disjunction, on the other a feeling almost of unity.
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This, indeed, is the felt basis of the ancient
philosophical problem of the One and the Many. The Greeks
sometimes felt there was only the Many, the plurality of
things, the overwhelming disunity of impressions and exper-
iences, the uniqueness of each event and of each individual
being, the confusion of categories, the defeat of ideas.
But they sometimes also felt those million disjunctions give
way to more and more ultimate unity, to the equally over-
whelming conjunction of all things in one final essence,
that perfection beyond all the smaller harmonies: the One.
They tried to resolve the paradox by philosophy, but succeeded
only in stating a conundrum which philosophy has yet to resolve.
We need not for our present purposes get lost in the
philosophies of the puzzle, but we must take note of the
experience upon which they are based and which they try to
explain. For everyone has to live out a practical ansv/er to
the problem. We cannot live with either extreme of the problem,
either with the undifferentiated One or with the disjoined Many.
Yet both are present in our experience every day, and constitute
the arch-problem within all our particular problems. The
question, then, is how to make workable sense out of the paradox.
We are often told that, when confronted with a problem,
we must clear our heads, cool our emotions, stop all daydreams,
become logical. But there are two main inadequacies of a
purely logical approach to thinking out problems. The first
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is that, whil 0 logic classifies things within an ascending
series of abstract categories, it does not classify them
in terms directly of each other. It does not achieve any
sort of order that is concrete. It does not help us see
hov7 one thing resembles another in function or structure,
but only how two things share some purely conceptual attri-
bute. Things connected in this way remain in fact mostly
disconnected, and the process of logical abstraction which
may seem at first sight to solve the One-and-Many problem
in reality leaves it pretty much untouched. It gets us
farther into logic, but no deeper into experience. It is
not from logic that the answers to real problems come.
But even more to the point here, such a system of
logical classification, if used too exclusively, makes the
mind static and rigid, hence incapable of creative solutions
to its problems. Because logic does not hold things up to
each other so much as to "higher" abstractions, it allows
one little or no free flow of associations, none of the
genuinely new insights that come from being generous with
the reins of thought. If poets were to follow abstract hier-
archies of classification, Bobby Burns would have paid scant
attention to his famous mouse, Shakespeare would never have
seen Time's scythe mowing away the years of love, and Wordsworth
remembering childhood would have had no intimations of immortal-
ity. And by exactly the same token, neither would Bell have
thought his way from the workings of the ear to the invention
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of the telephone, nor Hobbes from an impression of the
awesome mass and power of a whale to a theory of the
modern state. And no child V70uld have found a game to
plsy in the leaping of a frog. Too much logic leaves no
room for transcendenc.e of logic. Worse, the Many remains
the Many — now no longer as the multiplicity of unrelated
beings, but as the multiplicity of unrelated concepts.
However the problem of the One and the Many may be
answered in philosophy or logic, it is answered for the
concrete, problem-solving mind by the making of metaphors.
Metaphor is a way of getting some practical work done. If
it has grasped one thing, the mind has by that fact already
grasped another thing that shares the configuration. This
is sometimes called the "lateral transfer" of knowledge.
It is a horizontal shifting of what a man already knows in
one area into another area he had thought he did not understand,
only to find that he does understand it. The efficiency of
that kind of operation is obvious, for it makes single knov;ledge
do double work. The job of contextual metaphor is to put
equals, signs between the gestalt of one thing and that of another.
Thus, the contribution of contextual metaphor to the practical
solution of the problem of the One and the Many is that it lets
everything remain its ov;n unique self, while recognizing that
in their patterns things repeat each other and form unity.
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A metaphoric identity between one thing and another
is established because it is useful, and it vanishes as
soon as it is no longer needed. Of itself it is provisional
and ephemeral. It is a temporary classification. It is the
bridge from one thing to another. After one has crossed the
t>ridge he no longer needs it at all. Once he had thought
up the telephone, Bell did not have to fantasize any longer
about ears.
In short, the day-in-day-out solutions of specific
problems, if they are to be creative, depend on our capacity
to see the configuration of the problem, and to draw on what
we already know about the similar configuration of some other,
apparently unrelated bit of our experience and knowledge in
another area. It depends on making contextual metaphors.
They are the instruments of practical understanding.
It is by the making of comparisons, connections.
Expressive Metaphors
,
that the mind structures for itself
what its experience of reality has been:
/TG < > 0 < > En) < > r7 > M
It is also by the making of comparisons, connections.
Contextual Metaphors
,
that the mind pre-structures for itself
what its on-going experience of reality will be:
/XG < > 0 < > En) < > R/ <
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It is also by means of metaphor that individuals
and groups, and even the various dimensions of a single
personality, communicate to each other their understanding
of reality:
These are the basic uses of metaphor.
We turn now to the practical question: If making
metaphor is so basic a process, how does one become a master
of it?
CHAPTER I V
THE SCHOOLS
One way of estimating the damage done by the educa-
tional institution is to view it metaphorically as the owner
and trainer of pet dogs. Even at that job, it is, apparently,
a failure:
...if an animal is deprived of its natural
environment and society, sensorily deprived,
made mildly anxious, and restricted to the
narrowest possible spontaneous motion, it will
emotionally identify with its oppressor and
respond—v/ith lov7-grade grace, energy, and
intelligence— in the only way allowed to it.
The poor beast m.ust do something, just to
live on a little. There is no doubt that a
beagle can be trained to walk on its hind legs
and balance a ball on the tip of its nose.
But the dog will show much more intelligence,
force, and speedy feedback when chasing a
rabbit in the field. It is an odd thought
that we can increase the efficiency of learn-
ing by nullifying a priori most of an animal's
powers to learn and taking it out of its best
field .
^
But there is a criticism of education that goes farther
than that. It is more discriminating in its choice of meta-
phors. It rejects the idea of s tudent-as-dog in favor of
student-as-cat . Education, then, is the unnatural power that
makes dogs out of cats:
^Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis -education (N.Y.: Vintage
Books, 1964), p. 88.
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The tragedy of man is that, like the dog, his
character can be molded. You cannot mold the
character of a cat, an animal superior to the
dog. You can give a dog a bad conscience, but
you cannot give a conscience to a cat. Yet
most people prefer dogs because their obedience
and their flattering tail-wagging afford visible
proof of the master's superiority and worth.
^
But there is a criticism that goes still farther. It
rejects the animal metaphors altogether. The kind of narrow-
ness and rigidity of viev/point that animals — both dogs and
cats — need for their survival, is harmful to man. From
this viewpoint, education is seen as the unnatural force that
makes constricted little animals out of men who would be supple
Categorical and dogmatic thinking are more
suitable to cats and dogs than to human
beings .
^
These three statements, each by a man eminently influ-
ential in the field of education, vary in the sharpness of
their metaphors, but they all circle around a central idea:
Education is unnatural and denaturing. That in essence is
.
the main accusation levelled at the institution especially
for these last ten years or so. It was Dewey's objection
years ago as well, but to many people now he seems to be more
a patron saint of the present invested system than a mighty
critic of it. Dewey's reform somehow got deflected, and his
^A. S. Neill, Summerhill (N.Y.: Hart Publishing Co.,
1960)
,
p. 100.
^Korzybsky, quoted by Neil Postman and Charles
V7eingartner
,
Teaching as a Subversive Activity (N.Y. : Dell
Publishing Company), p. 105.
119
liberating and richly romantic ideas about children and about
learning became the slogans under which a more and more hard-
ened, a less and less responsive system developed. The slogan
was Learn by Doing, but the reality was Memorize What Other
People Do. The slogan was Child-Centered Education, but the
reality was Education-Centered Children.
The huge amount of criticism aimed at contemporary
education comes out of a widely held and increasingly clear
view of the mind as being essentially NOT a computer, that is,
not merely a storage system for isolated facts, and not merely
a syllogizer. So far so good. But the critics, who cherish
a more supple and subtle view of the mind, seem more able to
lambaste the actual procedures of education than to come up
with workable alternatives. Prophets without plans have arisen
on all sides to denounce a system that does not make sense.
We will look at what some of the prophets say, and after that
we will make our ov/n suggestion about what can be done about
it. In essence, they say education is too rigid, rationalistic,
moralistic, institutionalized, officialized — in a word, con-
scious . ^ They opt for, but generally do not show us how to
get to, an education more fluid, imaginative, liberating, sub-
jective, individualized — in a word, preconscious
.
We agree
^In the meaning of the word discussed above, p. 18 .
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with that ambition, and propose that the practical means
to that end will be found v;hen education begins to help
people in the making of metaphor.
But first, the critics.
A. Prophets Without Plans I: The Elegists
In a moment of outrageous enthusiasm, Edgar Fried-
enberg, who should and does know better, wrote of John
Holt's How Children Fail as being "in a class with Piaget...
Many of his accounts in fact might be excerpts from a play
by Pinter or Albee." None of that says anything about Piaget,
Pinter, or Albee, and precious little about Holt — except
that he touched a nerve in Edgar Friedenberg. The fact that
Holt inspired a crowd of imitators (Herbert Kohl and James
Herndon, among others) suggests that when he touched that
nerve he touched it dead center,. and in more people than
just Dr. Friedenberg.
His complaint, like Kohl's and Herndon's, is simple
enough. The schools are set up in such a way that they
contradict the children who go to them. These spontaneous,
investigatory, imaginative little learners become gradually
m.ore tense, anxious, guilt-ridden, fearful, frustrated, dis-
couraged, failure-prone. This list of adjectives has achieved
an almost ritual status in the contemporary literature of com-
plaints. When the complaints are aimdd at pedagogical methods
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alone, they amount to a plea for a problem-centered approach,
rather than an answer-centered approach. But they usually do
not stop there. Throughout the writings of the Holts, Kohls,
and Herndons there is implied, and often stated, the great
Romantic Thesis: Back to Nature.
The alternative -- l can see no other --
is to have schools and classrooms in which
each child in his own way can satisfy his
curiosity, develop his abilities and talents,
pursue his interests, and from the adults
and other children around him get a glimpse
of the great variety and richness of life.
In short, the school should be a great
smorgasbord of intellectual, artistic, creative,
and athletic activities, from which each child
could take whatever he wanted, and as much as
he wanted, or as little.
^
Almost essential to the Romantic Thesis is a kind of
incantatory despair, for there seems to be no way to escape
from the clav;s of the great enemy. Repressive Civilization.
What to do? You can read suggestions for
change in a lot of recent books by serious
and intelligent men. I suppose I could add mine.
But frankly, I have almost no hope that there
will be any significant change in the way we
educate our children -- for that, after all,
v;ould involve liberty, the last thing we may
soon expect -- and so I have thought merely
to describe one time for you, parents, kids,
readers, the way it is.^
^John Holt, How Children Fail (N.Y.: Dell Publish-
ing Company/ 1964), p. 180
.
^James Herndon, The Way It Spozed To Be (N.Y.:
Bantam Books, Inc., 1969Y~, ^pT 19^7
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We are left with the teacher-as-pelican
,
puncturing
his own breast in a splendidly inartyrial disregard of self,
to feed his young.
When I think of my work as a teacher one of the
children's favorite myths, that of Sisyphus,
continually comes to mind: the man condemned to
roll a rock up a mountain only to see it fall
back to the bottom, to return to the bottom
himself and take up his unending task. Without
hope and without cynicism, I try to make myself
available to my pupils. I believe neither that
they will succeed nor that they will fail. I
know they will fight, falter, and rise again
and again, and that if I have the strength I
will be there to rejoice and cry with them, and
to add my little weight to easing the burden of
being alive in the United States today.
There is much story-telling in the books of these men —
mostly atrocity tales about the school system, and elegies
about their own inspired-but-doomed efforts to operate within
and against it. They describe various of their projects with
the children, and many of them are truly inspiring examples
of sensitive and humane teaching. Indeed, many of these proj-
ects are designed to evoke associative thinking in the children,
to encourage them to make their own connections and achieve
their own syntheses. In virtually all but name, this is edu-
cation by metaphor and for metaphor. The trouble v;ith it seems
to have been that the teachers who tried it v/ere more successful
at removing external and artificial constraints on the children's
minds than at thoroughly activating and carefully disciplining
^Herbert Kohl, ^ Children (N.Y.
;
Library, 1968), p. 224.
The Nev/ American
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the preconscious activities of those minds once liberated.
The attempt to do that is certainly there, but the method,
the key, is not. At best, it is there in a first and re-
mote approximation. But that is apparently not enough for
The System. The System can only see it as foolish experi-
mentation, idle play, dangerous liberalism. Perhaps The
System does not really disagree with what these teachers
and authors are trying to do — perhaps it does not know
what they are trying to do, and suspects that they may
not either. Either way, the light, such as it is, gets put
out almost as soon as it is lit. And so, from these and
other popular romantic critics of education we get a vivid,
tragic sense of schools as prisons, students as jailbirds;
students as raw materials, schools as factories; schools
as molds, children as plastics — in other words, of schools
as systematic violators of the people they are supposed to
be serving.
But in the end that is all we get: a sense of the
tragedy, a mood of despond, and, in the case of Kohl espe-
cially, a confession of the inevitability of it all.
B . Prophets Without Plans II: The Medievalists
Adolescents often behave much like members
of an old-fashioned aristocracy ... (but ) modern
life is hostile to the aristocratic social
principle®...! have described my heuristic
®Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The Vanishing Adolescent (N.Y.
1 Publishing Company, 1969), p. 29.
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model of an adolescent as a knight in shining
Chino pants... I have encountered a goodly few
such errant defenders of the faith. ^ They...
(are) a fierce and warlike people,
. . .accustomed
to more open country ^ ° ... the traditions of a civil
service (—teaching) are not those of chivalry;
they do not emphasize courage feeling
,
imagin-
ation, breadth of vision, and independence of
action
.
The medieval professions and specialties were
structured in an ideal world that allowed for
communication, that was international, and in
which—in an important sense—the professions
were oddly spontaneous and free. Our learn-
ing is increasingly departmentalized and pre-
scribed.^^ In the medieval university, the
whole point of the gruelling trial of the
candidate was whether or not to accept him as
a peer... It was not to make comparative eval-
uations. It was not to weed out and select
for an extra-mural licensor or employer ... the
medievals thought they knew what a good job
of v7ork was and... we are competitive because
we do not knov/.^^
Friedenberg and Goodman, two of the weightier critics
of contemporary education, ma]ce substantially the same points
as the others: that the schools are geared for uniformity,
serve their own administrative convenience, and manipulate or
seduce their students into bored cooperation at the expense
of vital questioning and conflict. These two eloquent men tend,
however, to frame their objections in an especially alluring way.
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 31.
^ ^ ibid
.
,
p . 112
.
^
^Goodman, ibid .
,
p. 123.
^
^ Ibid
. ,
p . 128
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Foir always, at tha fringas of vision, alludad to constantly
aithar by diract rafaranca or by subtla choica of words,
is tha prasumad Goldan Aga, that madiaval momant whan tha
schools wara fraa, whan knighthood was in flower, when
society knew what it was all about. But it is meaningless
to pit the poetry of the Middle Ages against the steel and
cement technology of our own, or their simple world view
against our more fractured — and infinitely richer — one.
We are not the Middle Ages, and very few among us want to
be. And Edgar Friedenberg ought to be more careful than to
define the adolescent by a metaphor from that now done age,
for we know the name of the knight who lives outside of his
own proper time: Don Quixote.
Goodman makes one of the clearest and shortest state-
ments of a truly free education:
This theory counsels learning by doing,
entirely rejects competition and grading,
and encourages fantasy and guesswork. There
is no point, it claims, in learning the
"ansv7ers," for very soon there will be dif-
ferent answers .... In short, the theory is
Deweyan progressive education.
Friedenberg, of course, envisions the same thing. But neither
man seems to think there are workable ways to achieve such an
ideal. The ideal, like the Cathedral of Chartres, belongs to
• /
^
^Ibid p. 44.
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the Age and to the Realm of Poetry, and we to the age when
reading a newspaper is an act of high literacy. Consequently
Goodman tends to that final form of pessimism: anarchy. And
Friedenberg, in the same moment that he stops to admire the
sturdy independence, the "shaggy arrogance," of the modern
adolescent, notices also that, with a universal assist from
the schools, he is Vanishing
.
C. Prophets Without Plans III: The Elitists
And so, as always in affairs of the pendulum, we are
brought by the combined forces of gravity and inertia to the
other position. Jacques Barzun, speaking brilliantly out of
the elitist tradition of French schools, joins forces with
Banesh Hoffmann against the falsely democratized, homogenized,
standardized Araerican school system. The great lone enemy
here -- and properly so -- is named in Hoffmann's title, The
Tyranny of Testing
. The Test stands for everything the schools
do against the creativity and integrity of superior students:
The tests deny the creative person a signi-
ficant opportunity to demonstrate his creativity,
and favor the shrewd and facile candidate over
• the one v/ho has something of his own to say.
Unlike essay examinations, they are mainly con-
cerned with predetermined intellectual snippets...
They penalize the candidate who perceives subtle
points unnoticed by less able people, including
the test-makers...
They take account only of the choice of answer
and not of the quality of thought that led to
the choice ...
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They have a pernicious effect on education andthe recognition of merit.
Hoffmann's argument is intelligent, harsh, narrow,
academic, and right. Here, we are against the standardized
tests, not because they are tests (cf. the Holt-Kohl-Herndon-
Goodman-Friedenberg thesis), but because they are "unlike essay
examinations"! They are the wrong kind of test. We are
against them, then, because they work against "the best
students, who presumably would fare better in an open-ended
examination. The Hoffmann-Barzun preoccupation with the fate
the three percent amounts to a cause
,
and a very traditionally
and narrowly defined one at that.
...the tests... do not give the candidate a
significant opportunity to express himself.
If he is subtle in his choice of answers it
will go against him... If he is strong-minded,
non-conformist, unusual, original, or creative
--as so many of the truly important people are
he must stifle his impulses and conform as
best he can. . . .the profound student can hardly
escape a feeling of contempt— contemipt tinged
with dismay that these (unimaginative test-
writers) have acquired the pov/er to judge him. ^ ^
The sweet smell of aristocracy is in the air. But as
soon as we have sniffed it, the memory shoots back of Friedenberg'
s
old-fashioned aristocrats, against whom modern society bears
so hostile a forehead. The elitist argument falls within the
^^Banesh Hoffman, The Tyranny of Testing (London:
Collier-MacMi llan Ltd., 1962), p. 150.
^
^Ibid.
,
p. 91
.
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s airiG toirins as ths anarchist revolutionary's, and the dernocrat's:
that there is a Tyranny abroad, that it is iirunensely endowed,
and that it suppresses night and day "the subtle, probing,
critical, or creative mind." But both Barzun and Holt, both
Hoffman and Goodman, implicitly agree at the last frontier of
argument that the enemy is not each other. For finally they
are all incurable romantics, believers in human possibilities,
defenders of the maverick, heretics within the system, op-
timists aJoout what people can do if not falsely constrained
and speciously judged.
Hoffmann exposes the circular reasoning of the testing
technocrats. These people set up their "scientific" tests
because the evaluations and grades given at school are too
informal, too arbitrary. They then evaluate those very
tests according to whether the results correspond statisti-
cally to the grades actually given by the teachers in the
schools I This cosmic silliness is a booming business in the
USA.
Hoffmann's argument against testing is an argument
against pasturized evaluations of what individual students
can or cannot do. It is a plea for the return of "arbitrar-
iness," that is, of subjectivity, to the school world. What
he calls "the flight from subjectivity" in education has its
bleakest result in the national testing industry, but that
is only a part of the same system to which the liberal romantics
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also object, and object to for the same reasons: that it
is the enemy of the natural mind. That mind is not lock-
stepped. It is free, operates on hunches, makes up analo-
gies — is a preconscious as it is conscious.
The times are -such that all the threads of signifi-
cant criticism weave together one cloth.
They are also such that the criticism itself deepens
the despair, for the core of the argument seems always to be
that we are faced with an entrenched, repressive, powerful,
wealthy System -- against which, what can one man do? Thus,
everyone seems to frame the problem in one or other metaphor
of defeat, so that, like Richard II, we can only "sit upon
the ground and tell sad stories."
D. Toward A Plan
Perhaps the man least defeated by the homogenizing
school system has been, for these forty years and more, A. S.
Neill, founder of Summerhill. Neill set up his own radically
different school -- an alternative that cannot be followed
very often because it requires so massive an outlay of energy,
and so granitic a conviction of the rightness of the enter-
prise.
Neill's approach has the same kind of elegant sim-
plicity that has forever fixed St. Francis in the V'Jestern
imagination as, perhaps, the only one of us who was ever
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right: "Where there is hatred, let me sow love; where there
is injury, pardon." The tactic is simple. One finds what
to do by systematically reversing what everyone else is
doing. They are so abundantly and obviously wrong that
doing the opposite has to be right. At first sight this
seems to be anarchic — both Neill and St. Francis have been
called anarchists but in fact it is completely, minutely
systematic. Here, for example, are lists of words Neill
uses. In the left hand column are words that describe con-
ventional schools, in the right column words that describe
Summerhill
:
fear, hate
unhappiness
discipline
conscience
religious & moral
training
theory, concepts
authority
pessimism
,
conservatism
approval
,
love
happiness
freedom
natural goodness
personality, character
play
democracy
freshness, enthusiasm
The point here is that Neill is as systematic as the
schools he so generously despises. Though he sometimes talks
like one, not a laissez -faire educator . His approach,
if we may express it in words we have used before, is to be
at least highly suspicious of the strict, clear, static, pre-
cise categories of the conscious mind; and to be entirely
against the murky, hidden, destructive forces of the repressed,
unconscious mind; and to be fully in favor of the supple.
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personal, free, creative metaphoric processes of the pre-
conscious mind. Neill himself never uses exactly these
terms to describe his enterprise, perhaps for fear of making
too analytical a statement. And yet there it is : he wants
to free up the preconscious mind.
Summerhill might be defined as a school in
which play is of the greatest importance.
I am not thinking of play in terms of athletic
fields and organized games; I am thinking of
play in terms of fantasy.
And he goes on to speak of theater, music, dancing, sports,
and games.
Neill is a new kind of systematist, who finds his
own system in the reversal of everyone else's, including those
of his own Summerhill children.
Three girls had raided the kitchen larder.
The meeting fined them their pocket money.
They raided the kitchen again that night and
the meeting fined them a movie. They raided
it once more, and the meeting was graveled
what to do. The chairman consulted me. "Give
them tuppence reward each," I suggested.
"I-Jhat? VJhy
,
man, you'll have the whole school
raiding the kitchen if we do that." "You
won't," I said; "Try it." He tried it. Two
of the girls refused to take the money. And
all three were heard to declare that they
would never raid the larder again. They
didn't -- for about two months.
Neill seems to be a genius at breaking up pre-set ways of
thinking and behaving. By reversing them, he shows how changeable
^^Neill, ibid .
,
p. 62.
^
^Ibid.
,
p . 51.
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they are, hence how easy it is to explore alternative
structures
.
Nsill, of course, has been widely misunderstood by
both friend and foe as a destroyer of all structures. His
key idea of self-regulation, "the right... to live freely,
without outside authority in things psychic and somatic"
(p. 105), is particularly easy to misconstrue:
Tommy, aged four, bangs the notes of a
neighbor's piano with a wooden mallet. His
fond parents look on with triumphant smile
which means, "Isn't self-regulation wonderful?"
...any idea, old or new, is dangerous, if not
combined with common sense... The whole freedom
movement is marred and despised because so
many advocates of freedom have not got their
feet on the ground.
Clearly, Neill has his own standards. But he does not help
matters much by appealing to "common sense" or by telling
people to keep "their feet on the ground." Just where we
would want him to be explicit and clear he becomes allusive,
content to indicate a general direction.
I'Jhile much less radical than Neill, Sybil Marshall
nevertheless is a near cousin of his in her approach to chil-
dren, and her methods have the advantage of being much more
clearly stated. I believe that we can see in her explicitly
described activities with children a lesser version of what
Neill must do. She is not the systematically anti-system
^
^Ibid
. , p . 10 6.
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genius that he is, but in describing concretely what we
can call structured freedom she is much more helpful.
She describes an early moment in her development as
a teacher. Notice that what is at work in her reflections
here is a powerful natural sense of metaphor.
...the teacher's function ... is to make each
child to realize that history is like a
coral reef, composed, it is true, of things
that are dead, but in itself still living
and growing; and to show him his own life
and those of his playmates and peers as the
polyps being woven by time into the topmost
patterns. . . .My job v/as to create a taste for
history and to place before the children such
an array of tempting fare that they would
reach out and help themselves . ^
^
So far, Mrs. Marshall is making the metaphors for herself,
but she is also beginning to provide her students with the
opportunity to make their own connections. Her evolution as
a teacher brought her much farther into metaphor. She
gradually found that the way to proceed through a subject
was " symphonically , " that is, by the natural flowing of one
thing into another, and by the orchestration of diverse ele-
ments. There were to be no more artificial barriers between
one "subject" and another "subject." If the students felt a
connection between one thing and another, then ipso facto that
connection existed and deserved to be explored.
Though all the work is in some way related
to (a central) theme, it is not tied to it
Sybil Marshall, 7m Experiment in Education (Camljridge
University Press, 1963)
,
p. 45.
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nor llinitea by it, as it is in the so-called
project inethod"
; nor does it employ one
group of instruments only, as in the "center
of interest" method. My objection to both
those otherwise good ideas has been that the
various subjects have been made to fit into
the chosen theme, whether they would or not,
®ls6 neglected entirely because they were
too far away to be tied to it, however
clumsily. The "symphonic method" allows for
second subjects, bridge passages, variations,
differences of tempo, and indeed wholly
separate movements; yet the term's work,
like a symphony, is only completely satis-
factory as an entire whole.
Mrs. Marshall describes how the method worked for
one term. She started the term with a reading of the pro-
logue to The Canterbury Tales . The children noticed, and
liked, some of Chaucher's imagery; Mrs. Marshall therefore
encouraged them to "collect" any metaphors they might notice
elsewhere. She also conducted a few predictable lessons on
Chaucer and on Norman history for purposes of background.
This naturally le^d to a side-trip into the story of Thomas
a Becket. The children wanted to see the characters in Chaucer's
Prologue, and so she suggested they make paper mosaics of them.
And Chaucer's references to music evoked interest in playing
old instruments and singing old songs.
So far so predictable, though much better than what
usually happens to children — or to Chaucer. But then some-
thing interesting comes up. Mrs. Marshall suggests the children
^Oj.bid.
,
p. 172.
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v;rite their own tales about six modern characters of their
own invention who would meet at the London Airport on a
foggy night. The children become fascinated by the intrica-
cies of the airport, and of the flights into and out of it.
They even do some minor mathematical calculations to help
them figure out how the airport works. Mrs. Marshall en-
courages the children to follow out any connection that seems
to make sense to them. She supports them -- and no doubt
leads them too -- in their natural sense of metaplior. Indeed,
what she calls "the symphonic method" could equally (and less
metaphorically) be called the metaphoric method.
Over several years of working with children Mrs.
Marshall came to a smaller version of A. S. Neill's idea that
pre-made categories of thought, behavior, emotion and imagin-
ation, which then inevitably have to be enforced by external
autliority, are anti-educational. Indeed, they are anti-
child. The only thing that makes complete educational sense
is to encourage children in their explorations of the meta-
phors they themselves have come up with. If Mrs. Marshall
is to be faulted at all in her approach, it is because she
draws the lines of acceptable metaphor too close. Any meta-
phor leading into an art exercise she happily rewards, but
there is no mention in her book of anything that leads in
the direction of science, and little in the direction of
phvsical exploration of any sort. Nor are really adven-
f r. ,ome metaphoric connections much encouraged, even within
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the arts -- she prefers to stay rather close to home base.
Still, Mrs. Marshall has shown what A. S. Neill only hinted
at, and what all the others we have discussed despaired to
find: a method of freeing up the preconscious mind -- with-
out burning dov/n the schools, and even without any lynchings.
E. The State
,
Then
,
of the Question:
How To Ask a Question
.
Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner have condensed
the questions of educational reform down to two: What do
good learners do? What does a good teacher do? Here is
what they say in answer:
. . .good learners have confidence in their
ability to learn... tend to enjoy solving
problems .... seem to know what is relevant
to their survival and what is not. . . .prefer
to rely on their own judgment ... are usually
not fearful of being wrong.... are emphatically
not fast answerers .... are f lexible. . . .have a
high degree of respect for facts (which they
understand are tentative) .... do not need to
have an absolute, final, irrevocable resolution
to every problem.
The teacher rarely tells students what he
thinks they ought to know... His basic mode
of discourse with students is questioning. . . .
Generally, he does not accept a single state-
ment as an answer to a ques tion . . . . He en-
courages student-student interaction as
opposed to student- teacher interaction. And
generally he avoids acting as a mediator or
judge of the quality of ideas expressed. ... He
rarely summarizes the positions taken by stu-
dents on the learnings that occur.... His
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lessons develop from the responses of students
and not from a previously determined "logical"
s tructure
. . . . He measures his success in terms
of behavioral changes in students ^
i
Nothing is said here about how learners or teachers
develop such skills, nor is very much said about what these
skills might look like in practice. Still, we can see that
the really important issues in education are probably easier
to deal with than the universal paranoia allows us to think.
The key is: open learners, open teachers. Postman and
Wsingartner approach being operational when they zero in
on the art of asking a question. If that skill can be
developed, perhaps all is well. The problem, and its so-
lution, are then easier than anybody had thought:
Will your questions increase the learner's
will as well as his capacity to learn?
Will they help to give him a sense of joy
in learning?
Will they help to provide- the learner with
confidence in his ability to learn?
In order to get answers, will the learner
be required to make inquiries?....
Does each question allow for alternative
answers . . .
?
Will the process of answering the questions
tend to stress the uniqueness of the learner?
Would the questions produce different answers
if asked at different stages of the learner's
development?
Will the ansv/ers help the learner to sense
and understand the universals in the human
condition and so enhance his ability to draw
closer to other people?^^
^^Postman and Weingartner, ibid .
,
31 ff.
2
^Ibid.
, p . 66 .
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One senses one is absolutely sure — that that
describes the kinds of questions A. S. Neill and Sybil
Marshall ask their little people, the kind that Freidenberg
and Goodman would approve of with enthusiasm, the kind
Hoffmann and Barzun are after, the kind that would put Holt,
Kohl, Herndon, and all the other despairing teachers back
in business again, and, for good measure, the kind that
would revolutionize education without anyone's having to
buy a single non-revolutionary "revolutionary" gadget or
gimmick. For questions of this sort are designed, not to
provoke recall of a right question, but to evoke the use of
the mind's full resources, conscious and preconscious
,
logi-
cal and associative, univocal and metaphorical.
But how to ask such powerful questions?
F. Synectics
The two fundamental works of the mind are the crea-
ting (E < > M) and the communicating ( (|; ) of meanings
M
out of the othei>/ise random flow of experience. The tool
used in both works is metaphor.
The fundamental work of education, then, is to help
students to create and to communicate their own meanings. In
order to be helpful in those two works, education has essen-
tialJ.y only one thing to do: to ask the questions that will
«
open up the mind to metaphor.
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Synectics Education Systems has, to my knowledge,
worked out the only thoroughly practical, teachable, con-
crete approach to liberating, in a structured but not con-
fining way, the resources of the metaphor-making preconscious
mind. That is another way of saying that the Synectics
approach does what Postman and Weingartner say should be
done: it asks the kinds of questions that increase the
learner's will to learn, and joy in learning, and confidence;
that help him to make fresh inquiries, explore alternatives,
define his own way of approaching problems; and so on. What
Postman and Weingartner are implicitly asking for -- what
virtually all modern critics are implicitly asking for — is
what Synectics seems to give: a way to ask the questions
that liberate rather than constrict the mind, the questions
that invite metaphoric explorations rather than demand
sterile recall.
The most important assumption implicit in the Synec-.
tics understanding of the mind is that all meanings are
relative. There is nothing so true, so absolute, that it
cannot be looked at another way. No expressive metaphor is
perfectly expressive. No contextual metaphor sets up the
only possible context. Everything is literally question-
able. "Truth" and "meaning" do not reside in the thing seen
but in the way the thing is seen, and that angle of vision
is alterable. Meanings can fall apart and reassemble in
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different combinations. And that is what they must do if
we are ever to go beyond any status quo whatever, psycholo-
gical, moral, political, technological, scientific, re-
ligious, artistic, educational.
SES starts from an extremely simple view of how
the mind works. Confronted with something new, the mind
tries to understand it by reducing it to something already
known. SES calls this Making the Strange Familiar. But
co^f^oi^ted with the need to go beyond what it already knows,
to get a more useful hold on it
,
the mind has to shake off
its habitual attitudes and adopt new viewpoints. SES calls
this Making the Familiar Strange. Both processes result in
understanding, but the first results in what is normally
called "learning," while the second results in what is nor-
mally called "creativity." These labels are useful, but
it should be pointed out that "learning" -- connecting the
unknov;n to the known -- is a highly creative act, and that
"creativity" -- approaching old things in new ways — is
very much an act of learning.
Connecting one thing to another is making metaphor,
regardless of v/hich thing is "strange" or which "familiar."
The tool both of learning and of creativity is therefore meta-
phor. The most important contribution of SES to both processes
is that, instead of leaving them -to chance as education has all
but universally done, it gets deliberate about them. SES
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asks the kinds of questions that naturally and easily put '
the mind into a condition appropriate for creative learning.
Synectics says that by deliberate, conscious use of metaphor,
one can control how familiar to us one thing will seem and
how strange another will seem. ^ can manipulate our view
o^ reality ^ manipulating our minds , and we can manipulate
oi^ minds by manipulating the metaphors it sees through, and
^ can manipulate our metaphors by asking questions that lead
us from old ones to new ones
.
To my knowledge the Synectics work on metaphor is the
only one which approaches it as something that can be deliber-
ately cultivated. SES distinguishes three m.echanisms of
metaphor: Direct Analogy, Personal Analogy, and Compressed
Conflict. They are distinguished according to what kinds of
things are being compared in each, and what mental state is
being induced in each. The kinds of questions Postman and
Weingartner want us all to ask are, in my opinion, the ques-
tions that evoke one or other of these metaphoric processes.
"DIRECT ANALOGY is a simple comparison of two objects
or concepts: 'A crab walks sideways like a sneaky burglar'....
the subject of the analogy is the first part of the comparison —
'a crab'. The analogue of the analogy is the thing to which the
subject is compared -- 'a burglar'. Experimenting with
^^VJilliam J. J. Gordon, The Metaphorical Way of
Learning and Knowing (Cambridge, Mass.: Porpoise Books,
1971)
,
p". 18.
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comparisons between any two objects or concepts, the mind is
in a psychological state of speculation, a condition of free-
dom and detachment. "The mind will not speculate on command;
but when a person is asked, 'vVhat animal is like a steam
roller?' he is put into the psychological state of specula-
tion. V7hen the person begins to analyze the analogue, he is
put in the state of being detached from, in this example, the
steam roller ^ It should be observed that this is a con-
dition of pure speculation for as long as it lasts. The di-
rect analogies are being invented purely for their own sakes,
apart from immediate utility. Accordingly, the mind most
likely comes up with several possible analogies, and only
after its free-form, purely subjective speculation is over
will it begin to consider which analogy introduces the de-
sired Strangeness or Familiarity of viewpoint.
The second mechanism of metaphor distinguished by SES
is Personal Analogy, "a description of how it feels to iden-
tify with a person, a concept, a plant or animal, or a non-
living thing. The new element in this kind of analogy
is that- "I" am one of the terms of the comparison — my
feelings, movements, etc., are the analogue to which some-
thing else is being compared, or vice versa. The more pro-
found my identification with the other, the more genuine the
Personal Analogy is.
2^Tony Poze, "Rethinking Synectics Training," p. 4.
(unpublished.
)
^
^Gordon, ibid., p. 21.
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Here, emotion is considered to be a fundamental
form of knowledge. The world — or some piece of it — is
understood emotionally. Wliether one invests external
reality with emotion or emotion with external reality, the
same two realms of being are brought together. The reader
is reminded, for example, of Einstein's use of Personal
Analogy in working out the fundamental concepts of his
relativity theories. Personal Analogy is central to any
kind of problem-solving. By putting himself inside a pro-
blem, by feeling it out, identifying with some aspect of it,
one gains the kind of intense and immediate subjective involve-
ment that can yield the most pov/erful insights.
The third and subtlest of the SES metaphoric mechan-
isms is Compressed Conflict, "a poetic, two-word description
on a high level of generality where the two words don't seem
to fit and sometimes actually contradict each other. For
instance, a Compressed Conflict description of cellophane
tape is imiprisoned freedom . . . .this expression reflects inter-
nal conflict. The psychological state induced by the
conscious use of Compressed Conflict is "Deferment and Tolera-
tion of the Apparently Irrelevant; here the mind operates in
a state of flux... of deferred judgment. ^
^
^
^
Ibid
.
, p . 26
.
2
^Poze
,
ibid.
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The importance of Compressed Conflict lies in its
ability to put the mind into a state of dynamic tension, hence
in its ability to help the mind see things vitally rather
than statically. Here, everything is seen to be constituted
of elements or principles in an exquisite tension, which is
the source of what they are and what they do. To understand
things on such a level is to understand them in the deepest
way
.
Just as a Direct Analogy can be anywhere from very
obvious to very novel, and a Personal Analogy can be anywhere
from slightly involved to highly emphatic, so there is a range
possibilities in Compressed Conflict. The simplest form
of Compressed Conflict is a straight-out contradiction, as
in the example of "imprisoned freedom" used by Gordon above.
The subtler form is paradox; Gordon uses the example of "pro-
toplasmic kiss," a phrase used by a neurologist to describe
how the nerve endings might meet.
One will notice that in each of the three mechanisms
SES has distinguished, the original idea of Familiarity and
Strangeness can be found. The idea is that, with practice
and training, one can deliberately control Direct Analogy,
Personal Analogy, and Compressed Conflict either to make the
strange familiar or to make the familiar strange — either
to "learn" or to "create." .The art of asking questions
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a Weingartner is the art of evoking one or other of
the kinds of metaphors.
By the deliberate manipulation of the three kinds
of metaphor SES has for the first time formalized an approach
to the preconscious elements of thought -- and that, po-
tentially, in all fields. The application is simple enough.
In general, it involves stating literally and accurately
what one wants to deal with, and then working out from its
core element into a Direct Analogy of some sort; the Direct
Analogy then becomes internalized through Personal Analogy,
which in turn is then reduced to the two words of a Com-
pressed Conflict. From the Compressed Conflict we go to
some more concrete Direct Analogy which exemplifies it,
and from this last analogy work our way back to the original
business, borrowing from the analogue whichever of its
elements seem to have a payload to offer. The v/hole proc-
ess involves both rational and nonrational factors, as any
kind of fertile thinking does. But here the nonrational,
emotional, fantasy elements are separated out, formalized,
and deliberately manipulated, at the same time that they
remain perfectly free.
But perhaps examples of the metaphoric process in
action will compliment this abstract discussion of it.
G. The Nuns and the Police
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The examples I wish to cite of the metaphorical
approach come from two personal experiences of mine during
the past year. One was with a group of Roman Catholic nuns
in San Francisco, the other with a group of police officers
from Western Massachusetts. The work with the nuns took
the form of a week-long workshop on the relationships among
religion, psychology
,
and education. The work with the
police was a year-long course in English Composition. Cen-
tral to both was an exploration of metaphor.
The sisters all belonged to the same Order but were
teaching in different schools. They shared a profound dis-
couragement over the educational aims and methods preferred
in the schools where they were teaching, and obtained per-
mission from their superiors to study out together what an
alternative school might be. If they were successful in
conceptualizing such a school clearly enough, it was hinted,
they might also receive permission actually to set it up
as an experiement to be underwritten by the Order. These
sisters had reached an impasse in their thinking about
schools and wanted some input from someone else to get them
started again.
The three of us who were conducting the workshops --
a psychologist, a priest, and myself -- felt there was indeed
an impasse somewhere, but we could not at first see where
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It was. After some confusion we decided to try to explore
some metaphors of education with the sisters. They them-
selves had tried, unsuccessfully, to do this by viewing
education as a process of artistic creation. The problem
V7ith that metaphor was that none of the sisters was her-
self an artist, and the only notions any of them had of
artistic creativity were amorphous and came at second hand.
We noticed, though, that the sisters also used other meta-
phors when speaking of education, unconsciously to be sure,
and quite spontaneously. They spoke of "cultivating" the
mind, of planting" ideas, of the "production line" mood
of classrooms, of the "cell block" construction of most
school buildings, of the teacher's "parental" role, etc.
Here were metaphors galore: school as garden, as factory,
as prison, as family. We decided to try one of the meta-
phors more thoroughly, and chose the garden. We chose it
because of its familiarity (as applied to education, it
dates at least back to Rousseau)
,
and because of its possi-
ble religious overtones (we had in mind the Garden of Eden) .
We asked the sisters to forget about schools for a while
and to talk about gardens, gardeners, gardening. We felt
that a thorough exploration of the sisters' feelings and
ideas about gardens would, in the end, say a great deal
about their real feelings and ideas about education.
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The idea did not work. The nuns could not for-
get about education. They kept translating everything
they were saying about gardens back into school talk, thus
choking the metaphor. They were in effect not talking about
schools as gardens, but about gardens as schools. We could
not stop them from doing this. I was on the verge of throw-
ing the garden metaphor out and trying another one, when
the psychologist among us observed that it was not a meta-
phor that was failing here, but metaphor as such. This
group for some reason could not to do what I had been asking
them to do. They could not make a metaphor for education.
But why not?
After some very painful explorations, it turned out
that the sisters could not deal with education metaphorically
because, for them, education itself already was a metaphor.
They were not interested in schools as such, but in something
else that schools and school reforms had com.e to stand for
figuratively in their minds. When they said, "Schools are
dull, uncreative, deadly, sterile," they actually meant,
"My life is dull, uncreative, deadly, sterile." When they spoke
of reforming the schools, they meant reforming their own
lives. When they spoke of trying new ways of teaching they
really meant trying new ways of living. We had not been able
to get the sisters to do metaphor because they were already
busy doing it, but did not realize it. Our job, oddly
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enough, turned out to be to get them to stop doing meta-
phor
,
or rather
,
to become conscious of doing it and to con-
trol the metaphoric process lest it control them.
The experience with the police is summed up, in my
mind, by one word; "turtles." Some forty-five policemen
and I had spent several months of weekly meetings exploring
various uses of metaphor and playing with their possibilities.
At first there was some resistance, but it came mostly out
of discomfort with something unfamiliar rather than out of
outright disapproval or rejection. We started by using some
of the Synectics materials to loosen up the imagination, and
after a little getting acquainted the policemen had fun with
such bogglers as: "Wiiat color is sleep?" "Which is softer,
mud or midnight?" "You are the world's greatest inventor.
From what animal did you get the idea for the wheel? for the
vacuum cleaner?"^® The policemen realized after a while that
the importance of such questions did not lie in their apparent
silliness, but in the way they had of freeing the imagination
and the feelings. There were no right and wrong answers here,
only more or less intriguing ones. Consequently it became pos-
sible to talk of and to experiment fairly broadly with Expres-
sive and Contextual Metaphor.
One day toward the end of the course we were doing
some purely analytical work, and had said nothing about
2 8william J. J. Gordon, V?hat Colo^ ^ S leep ?
(Cambridge, Mass.: Porpoise Books, iTfT) , passim .
metaphors
.
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I had asked the policemen to state in propo-
sitional form thirty-five distinct problems they faced in
their profession not other people's problems, but their
own. They were then to pick out of that list the five or
six they individually felt were the most important. They
then were to boil those down to one over-arching master
problem, that contained or caused most of the others. This
was intended as an exercise in analysis and logic. When we
were trying to find the one core problem we had considerable
difficulty and almost abandoned the effort. But one man
at that point blurted out, "Turtles!" No one in the room
guffawed, called him an idiot, shouted obscenities, swore —
the range of things they could usually be counted on to do
when confronted with a strange idea, especially if it came
from a colleague. Instead, they all turned to the man and
waited for him to explain. One man did net v;ait. He just
said, "That's right!"
The man who had thrown turtles into the conversa-
tion has, by his ov/n admission, never been particularly
skillful in the use of language. Everyone in the room knew
that, and waited for him to explain himself. He said only
one sentence in explanation: "We're hard because we're
soft." I had never before seen such instantaneous and
unanimous agreement in a classroom as I saw in the roar
of agreement that followed on that one remark. Here was
'^;c core problem -- what to do with one's vulnerabilities --
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and the man with the metaphor had found it for everyone.
The discussion turned to the different kinds of softness
these men felt, both good and bad softnesses, and the differ-
ent kinds of hardnesses they threw up around them, both
good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate hardnesses.
The metaphor gave everyone a framework within which to
organize and express their experience.
What happened with the nuns and with the police
suggests something of the range and potential importance of
the metaphoric approach. Let us now consider the matter a-
gain, but on a more general level.
H . Teaching and Learning
We speak of "a teacher" "teaching" "a subject" "to
students." What does each term mean?
Let us start with "a subject": what is it? Cer-
tainly not something given a priori by the nature of tilings.
^
It is a human invention, and is alterable. It is what the
group of people vitally interested in it, active in it, say
it is. It is the focus of a common concern, an
area agreed
by some people to be important for their survival,
develop-
ment, or comfort. Physics, for example, is simply
whatever
physicists do; physicists define physics, not vice
versa.
VJhat physicists, in either wisdom or folly,
exclude from
physics is by that fact not physics. Likewise
art is what
artists do: it is the collective product of
their interest,
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involvement, and work. Art is not something pre-existing
and independent that then defines who is and who is not an
artist. It IS the artist — or better, the whole community
of artists — that define what art is, and they define it
by doing it. Thus, "a subject" is the area of interest
and labor common to those who say they are its practitioners.
People become practitioners of something because they feel
it matters for their survival, development, or comfort.
It organizes their experience in a useful way. The defi-
nition of "a subject" is: E < > M.
What, then, is "a teacher"? He is only one of the
practitioners of a subject, one of those for whom this gen-
eral area of interest and labor is important in some way
for survival, development, or comfort. The difference be-
tween a teacher and other practitioners of a subject is
that the teacher is interested mostly, or largely, in people
who are not yet practitioners of it but who might become so.
And "a student"? A student is a person who might be,
or who is becoming, a practitioner of a subject (or subjects).
He is one who is trying to sort out what is important for
his own survival, development, or comfort, and who looks for
people who can help him in that work. He is exploring his
experience by exploring the metaphors that might serve to
structure or prestructure it.
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Thus, the difference between a student and a
teacher is very small. And the distinction between them
and those who are the professional embodiments of what we
conventionally call "subjects" is smaller still. They are
all people who have structured, or are structuring, and
are pre-structuring their more or less shared experiences
by means of more or less shared metaphors, and who are
helping each other in the enterprise:
And that is all that is meant when one says "a teacher"
"teaches" "a subject" to "students."
There is, then, one overriding question that sums
up all the central questions of teaching:
y practitioners
How helpful are the M's through v/hich the n teachers of
^ / students \
( express > / v X
a subject < prestructure < ) their E?
/ communicate
^
Or, to break it down furthers x
^practitioners )
a) What are the E's of the ? teachers f of a subject,
[
students j
and to what extent do they overlap? where and why
diverge? Note that the question could be broken
down further by reducing E to the formula:
(G < > 0 < En) < > R.
b) What are the M's of the
practitioners
teachers
students
of a
subject, and to what extent do they overlap? wher
and why diverge?
How usefully do they express ( >) the
Are there alternatives to them?
How usefully do they prestructure (< )the E? Are there alternatives to them?
Hew useful are they in the communications
(sp) among the practitioners, teachers,
students?
c) How can we manipulate the M's to
The metaphoric mechanisms discovered by Synectics
seem to offer the most promise here.
These, then, are the questions to which an education
for metaphor and by metaphor would have to address itself.
I . Aims of an Education of Metaphor
A curriculum designed to encourage and develop the
processes of metaphoric thought would have four aims
:
1. To prepare students for metaphoric- thought
,
by
systematically "stocking" their imaginations
with the kinds of images that have the great-
est potential of being useful as analogies;
2. To prepare students for applied metaphoric
thought, by first systematically encouraging
them to make metaphor-for-its-own-sake , without
reference to the solution of specific problems;
this is to develop the capacity to fantasize
freely but in a controlled way;
better the E's?
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3. To use the process of metaphoric thoughtin virtually any subject area, as both atool for releasing the creative potential
of the students
,
and as a tool for develop-ing their ability to analyze the work of
others
;
4. To develop in the students the ability todetect and to criticize any use of metaphor
which is weak, or misleading, or unconscious,
or in any other way inadequate.
These objectives are stated here in order of logical
priority, not necessarily pedagogical priority. It may, for
example, be better for the purposes of actual teaching to go
ahead and "make metaphor" without waiting for the students
to have a wide range of experiences and images to draw on.
It might be better to encourage a critical attitude before
encouraging a creative one. These are matters which would
be handled differently in different subjects and at differ-
ent levels. Still, all four objectives are simultaneously
important, and ought, in some way, to be simultaneously pur-
sued.
We will outline each of the four objectives in turn.
It should be clear, however, that we are trying to establish
a general pattern of approach; in no way do the following
pages constitute even a sketchy handbook for department
chairmen. For that reason, they are all but devoid of re-
ferences to specific disciplines. Very probably the approach
could be used in almost any discipline -- not only in the
liberal arts, where its relevance might be more obvious.
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But the truth of that assertion could be established only
after a good deal more consultation and experiment than
anyone has yet done.
THE FIRST AIM: Stocking the Imagination
The imagination is constantly being supplied with raw
materials. But the supplying is often sporadic and selec-
tive, too much limiited by the individual's immediate interests
and by his environment. The school ought to intervene to
make sure, as far as possible, that students have seen much,
and have stored much.
The kind of seeing involved here requires a quasi-
scientific accuracy, but of itself it is not scientific; it
is not to serve as the basis for elaborate systems of class-
ification, nor as raw materials for the making of hypotheses.
The emphasis here is on noting well the structures and func-
tions of many things, these being the dimensions of things
that will be most useful in metaphoric thought.
Of course anything might be used in a metaphor. The
problem here is to concentrate on the kinds of things that
most likely will function there, and will be of the greatest
use. We suggest three areas for such observation:
1. The cycles of nature. the yearly seasons, the
lunar month, the solar day, the tides, the weather,
perhaps even the cycles of evolution. We know that
such things have universally been an important
source of metaphor in literature and painting, where
they are often used to express subjective emotional
states. We know, too, that the cyclical nature
of these phenomena has a powerful appeal to the
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mind, and is frequently influential (usually in
a concealed way) in the formulation of myths,
theories of history
,
interpretations even of
economics and politics, patterns of psychologi-
cal development, and common sense judgements of
experience
.
2. Life forms . Each life form, and every part
of every life form, is the "answer" to a set
of practical "problems." Looking at as wide
a variety of organisms as possible in order
to isolate (a) the problems they have con-
fronted and (b) the structural and functional
forms they have evolved for solving them, is
potentially of great value in the metaphoric
solution of human problems. Many technical
or pragmatic problems can be and have been
profitably seen as analogous to natural
ones, and even human ethical and political
systems are to some extent based on analo-
gies with "natural order. " Artists too --
whether realistic or not in their styles --
have generally dra\\?n on natural life forms
to help solve some of their own specifically
aesthetic problems.
3. Non- life forms, and machines . The
structures and functions of matter in its
almost endless combinations, whether macro-
or micro-cosmic, whether of natural or human
design, supply probably the clearest and
most accessible images of cause- and-ef feet
,
and of structural patterns. Such things,
of course, are fundamental in the making
of useful metaphors.
A fourth area could be added except that
listing it among the others gives the im-
pression that it is only one among several.
It is too far-reaching for that. It is the
dimension of the psychological. To the
extent feasible, attention ought to be
paid in all three of the areas mentioned
above to psychological analogues of the
structures and functions of the things
being studied. To notice such analogues
is already to be dealing in metaphor;
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way of developing a psychological aware-
ness in students without isolating the
inner
_ emotional life from the rest of
experience -- an isolation too often
unwittingly encouraged by the separate
study of psychology.
It should be stressed again that the sustained observation of
structures and functions which we are suggesting here has only
a logical priority in the development of metaphoric skills.
Making such observations is a habit of mind that needs to be
constantly encouraged, used, and increased. A curriculum
designed to develop metaphoric skills would probably include
special sections on "stocking the imagination" at every phase
and level, in an ascending order of precision and sophistication.
THE SECOND AIM; Making Metaphors
Although metaphors are basically tools for getting
v-7ork done, they are also play-things
,
and should be encouraged
as such. Fantasy is something that ought to be engaged in
simply because it is there, and, regardless of whether we
officially value it or not, it does and alv/ays will take up
a lot of time and a lot of energy. It seems better to ac-
knowledge and take advantage of so determined a thing, rather
than to mount futile campaigns to be rid of it.
If, then, the first objective is to stock the imagin-
ation, the second is simply to use it for its own sake.
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In encouraging the making of metaphors
,
one ought
not to give priority to any specific kind; one ought, how-
ever, to try to make sure the students experiment broadly.
A teacher could make sure that such experiments were taking
place, by asking students to make all of the following
kinds of comparisons
:
1. compare the inorganic to
compare the organic to
the inorganic
the organic
'the psychological
the inorganic
-the organic
the psychological
the inorganic
compare the psychological to — the, organic
^the psychological
compare things that are "obviously" similar;
compare things that are not "obviously" similar,
compare things for comic effect;
compare things for serious effect.
4. compare things for stylistic purposes;
compare things for purposes of deeper
understanding.
5. make comparisons that are functionally
insignificant
;
make comparisons that are functionally
significant.
The value of 1. is practice in crossing lines of
demarcation between the various classes of things , a habit
essential to creative metaphor.
The value of 2. is practice in what the Synectics
people call Making the Familiar Strange, and Making the
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Strange Familiar, i.e., practice in controlling the
degree of newness one introduces into his perspective
through his choice of metaphors.
The value of 3 . is practice in the literary and
^^tistic effects inherent in many metaphors.
The value of 4 . is practice in distinguishing be-
tween style (grace, cleverness, charm) and thought (com-
prehension, problem-solving).
The value of 5. is practice in evaluating the
intellectual payload of individual metaphors.
The purposes here, besides the sheer generating of
metaphors
,
is gradually to build in the students an aware-
ness of the range of metaphoric usuage, and a control of
that range.
This purpose can be helped along by occasionally
studying metaphors in selected literary works (and non-
verbal metaphors in other arts) that would illustrate the
various uses and types. But the real emphasis should not
be on the study of other people's metaphors, so much as on
the creation of one's own.
THE THIRD AIM: Using Metaphors
This, really, is the chief aim.
What is proposed here is the consistent and system-
atic use of metaphoric thought in at least some phases of
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virtually any subject (excluding subjects that aim for
purely manual or physical skills)
.
Every subject can be, and should be, reduced to
a series of problems, rather than, as has been traditional
and all but universal, to a series of principles. The
principles of a subject emerge naturally enough through the
sustained attempt to solve the problems the subject is
addressed to. Dealing with a subject in a problem- and
metaphor-oriented way would lead to some such process
as the following:
1. The teacher and students isolate the problem,
and reduce it to the briefest statement pos-
sible. If it is their own problem, the stu-
dents are called on to be creative in solving
it, while if it is someone else's they are
called on to be analytic and critical of the
other person's definition and solution of it.
In either case, the isolation and the state-
ment of the problem should generally be put
into writing by the students.
2. Once the problem is clearly stated, the
teacher begins the metaphoric process, in
whichever of the following ways is appropriate:
a. He suggests an analogue, and gets the
students to explore it and apply it to
the problem. The teacher's purpose here
would be mainly to get his students into
the metaphoric process for the sake of
practice. Or:
b. He helps the students to come up with
their own metaphors and to explore them.
To do this, he would have to draw on the
student's own imaginative resources,
and on the types of metaphor-making
mentioned above in connection with the
2nd aim. Or:
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c. He helps the students to study,
analyze, and criticize the metaphors
used by someone else in the solution of
the problem at hand. The students
should be encouraged to explore al-
ternative metaphors on their own, as
in a. and b. above.
In any of th-ese approaches, the teacher:
a. has to make sure that the metaphors
come from a wider and wider range of
experience as time goes on; and,
b. has to make sure that the students
stay with a given metaphor a sufficiently
long time to explore it thoroughly, and
to follow out whatever associations come
to mind because of it in the course of
discussion. He might, incidentally, be
able to encourage the students to regard
some of the analogues as things- to-be-
studied in their own right; and/
c. he should encourage the students to
find as many alternative metaphors as they
can, and as seem useful; and/
d. he should encourage the students to
do as much writing as seems reasonable,
to express the process they are involved
in and the product they come up with.
3. Once the metaphoric dimension has been explored,
the teacher helps the students to make use of it in
solving the original problem:
a. by lining up the elements of the metaphor
with the elements of the problem; and/
b. by transferring information from the
metaphor to the problem; and
/
c. by deciding for or against prior solutions
to the problem; and /
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d. by making actual use of the resolution
the problem in an artistic, technical, orphilosophic way — whichever suits the
nature of the original task.
THE FOURTH AIM: Criticizing Bad Metaphor
This aim involves practice in judging the useful-
ness of particular metaphors that have been made by others.
1. In the study of mythology, comparative religion,
sj^thropology
,
and of the arts related to these,
students should be using the criteria to determine
which problems the great myths have helped solve,
and how, and which problems they either created
or simply failed to solve. Among other things,
such an investigation would help students to
clarify their own values and standards.
2. Students should be encouraged to track down
the hidden metaphors current in popular culture,
advertising, politics, entertainment. This
activity is closely related to that of the
semanticists
,
and many of their books could be
helpful here. Such an excercise would help
students to clarify their own values and stan-
dards.
3. In the study of psychology (and of literary
and artistic works that are psychological in
their orientation)
,
students should look for
and evaluate the conscious and unconscious
images that determine value and even control
behavior.
4. Much attention should be paid to the study
of the biographies of the great men of, e.g.,
science and politics, in an effort to uncover
and evaluate the metaphoric images that
were instrumental in their discoveries or
policies
.
Implied throughout is the matter of standards, values,
norms. The only values which we are implying, and the only
ones v/e would v;ish actually to teach, are these:
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1. It is better to be conscious than unconscious
about the metaphoric images that control one's
thought, define his values, and determine hisbehavior
;
2. It is better to be deliberate than automatic
in the use of such images, and to take responsi-
bility for where they lead one in action and behav-
ior;
3. A metaphor ought to be freshly chosen each time
it is used, lest by being repeated it come auto-
matically to seem right, and become less and less
conscious, less and less deliberate, and more
and more in automatic control of one's attitude
and behaviors.
Beyond that, we do not wish so much to teach
what is valuable or true, as to teach that values
and judgments of truth do exist, that they are
implied in the images that structure our mental
world, and that the selection of those images can
be both defended and criticized on a purely prag-
matic basis. The suggestions outlined here ar^e
posited on the assumption that all these matters
are relative — not relative in the sense that
no judgment can be made of them, but relative
in the sense that any judgment must be based on
the appropriateness of a specific image to a
specific problem. The problems come first,
and the images we construct to deal with them
make no sense apart from them.
J. Conclusion
Our purpose in these pages has not been to write
a handbook of educational reform. The focus of attention
has been more on articulating ideas than on outlining pro-
grams. But the ideas themselves are such that they point
to action. These ideas on the purposes and mechanisms of
metaphor have been developed in part, for their own pure
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sake because they are interesting, but in part too for
their eventual practical payload because besides being
interesting they are also simple, tough, useable.
If indeed the mind works by metaphor, then metaphor
IS what we should be teaching. if, moreover, there is
nothing esoteric about metaphor
— if it comes naturally,
if it is fun to do, if it tempts a person into becoming
subjectively involved in the processes of learning and
creating, if it makes people comfortable with changing
meanings, if it genuinely democratizes knowledge and the
approaches to knowledge, if it puts a person back in touch
with the fullness of his ov;n individual resources, if it
opens up worlds of discourse among people who differ from
each other -- then metaphor is exactly what we should be
teaching
.
V-Jhat besides metaphor should we teach? But the
point is that everything is included within it. There
is nothing besides it. It is the process at work through-
out all knowledge, and in all knowers. It is, therefore.
the bone and the blood of education.
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